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GILMORE SPOKE TOO SOON: CONTRACT
RISES FROM THE ASHES OF THE BAD
FAITH TORT
Kerry L. Macintosh*
"We are told that Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is," declared Professor Grant Gilmore nearly twenty years ago in his controversial book, The Death of Contract.'
Gilmore viewed classical contract theory as "dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything." 2
"Since the ideal was not attainable," the theory sought to restrict contractual liability within the narrowest possible limits 3 -in part, by keeping contract damages low and by sharply differentiating them from tort
damages.4 But, Gilmore continued, classical contract theory had gone
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Pomona
College, 1978; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1982.
I thank Professor Steven Smith of the University of Colorado School of Law, and Professors June Carbone and Howard Anawalt of the Santa Clara University School of Law, for
their thoughtful advice and suggestions. Also due praise for their diligent and effective research assistance are Randy Wilson and Katharina Martinka, J.D., Santa Clara University
School of Law, 1992; Ruth Silver-Taube and Marcine Seid, J.D., Santa Clara University
School of Law, 1993; and Matthew Thullen, J.D., University of Michigan School of Law,
1992. Last, but not least, I thank my husband, Mark Eibert, J.D., Stanford Law School, 1982.
He is my first and best editor.
The Author was awarded the 1992 Best Writing by a Young Lawyer Award from the
American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers for three of her recent writings, including,
Letters of Credit: Curbing Bad-FaithDishonor, 25 UCC L.L 3 (1992); We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 673 (1993); and this Article.-Ed
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 48. For example, consider the nineteenth-century response to Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). That decision established the rule that a victim of
breach could recover consequential damages when the party in breach had notice of special
circumstances leading to those damages. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 49-50. Classical scholars
strongly disapproved of this aspect of Hadley. Mere notice was not enough, they argued;
consequential damages should not be recovered unless the party in breach had deliberately
assumed the risk. Id. at 50-52.
Ultimately, this attempt to construe Hadley restrictively failed. Today, damages are considered foreseeable-and therefore recoverable-if they follow as the result of special circumstances that the party in breach had reason to know. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 351 (1979); see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 914-15 (2d
ed. 1990).
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into a "protracted period of breakdown" during the twentieth century,'
as evidenced by the wide range of remedies now available for breach of
contract, including specific performance, punitive damages, and consequential damages., As classical theory continued to dissolve, Gilmore
concluded, contract would eventually be "reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort,... [the] residual category of civil liability."'
Gilmore not only declared contract dead, but also conducted an autopsy, seeking to ascertain the social, political, and historical reasons for
the apparent demise of classical theory. Classical theory was born and
grew during the nineteenth century at about the same time that the free
market of classical economic theory was popular.' Classical theory was
consistent with the narrow scope of social duty during the nineteenth
century, as represented by slogans like "No man is his brother's
keeper." 9 But during the twentieth century, Gilmore asserted, the cultural landscape changed. Human beings were no longer independent individuals, but rather, interdependent "cogs in [the] machine" of a greater
society.10 Thus, the death of classical contract theory reflected a more
general transition from "nineteenth century individualism to the welfare
state.""1
This Article has two purposes. First, it asserts that, contrary to Gilmore's thesis, contract is alive and well. During the two decades since
Gilmore published his book, the law has witnessed the birth, growth, and
death of the "bad faith" tort-the cause of action for tortious breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
Had it ever been widely accepted, the bad faith tort would have proven
Gilmore's point; such acceptance would have cut the very heart out of
classical contract doctrine by supplanting the traditional, limited remedies for breach of contract with the more expansive remedies of tort.
Instead, the bad faith tort was the one to fall, as courts rushed to reaffirm
the limited remedies that form the core of classical contract theory.
Second, this Article shows that contract stands on a sturdy policy
foundation. Gilmore speculated that contract was dead because its supporting value, individualism, had been undermined by a trend towards
greater social responsibility. But, as I explain, both individual freedom
and social responsibility supported the rise of the bad faith tort, at the
5. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 57.
6. Id. at 83-84.
7. Id. at 87.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Id. at 95.
10. Id.
11. Id at 95-96.
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expense of contract. More importantly, the death of the bad faith tort
and the triumphant return of contract reflect the predominance of two
other policy considerations that support the traditional, limited remedies
for breach of contract: efficient allocation of resources and economic
growth.
Part I of this Article creates a framework for analysis by describing
the history of the bad faith tort. Part II begins the analysis by taking a
critical look at early bad faith tort decisions. One of the most striking
features of those cases was the development of a quasi-fiduciary model of
contract that imposed upon the stronger contracting party the moral obligation to perform for the benefit of the weaker party. Accepting altruism as the moral foundation of the quasi-fiduciary model, I show that the
rise of the bad faith tort provided temporary support for Gilmore's assertion that contract was dead-the victim of an emphasis upon social responsibility. However, later cases reaffirmed the continuing vitality of
contract by retreating from the quasi-fiduciary model and rejecting the
tort.
Part III reveals that early bad faith tort cases also expressed concern
regarding inherent incentives to break promises within certain contractual relationships, such as insurance. Accepting individual autonomy as
the policy foundation of the moral obligation to keep promises, I show
that the bad faith tort vindicated freedom by deterring promise breaking.
Thus, although the rise of the bad faith tort provided some support for
Gilmore's claim that contract was dead, it contradicted his theory that
the death of contract reflected a trend away from individualism. Individual autonomy and social responsibility were not enemies, but rather allies
in the tort's successful opening salvos against contract. However, even
with these powerful policy supporters, the tort ultimately lost the war.
Recognizing that few contractual relationships presented a serious risk of
promise breaking, later cases rejected the tort, thereby confirming the
continuing vigor of contract.
Finally, part IV shows that early bad faith tort decisions reflected a
desire to deter inefficient breach within certain contractual relationships,
such as insurance. But the courts eventually realized that only a few
relationships produced mostly inefficient breaches of contract. Later
cases returned to traditional contract remedies, reflecting the overwhelming importance of two policies supporting such remedies: efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. As the courts rejected tort
remedies for breach of contract, classical contract theory emerged a triumphant phoenix from the ashes of the dying bad faith tort.
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HISTORY OF THE BAD FAITH TORT

Every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and enforcement. 2 One widely accepted theory of the implied covenant conceptualizes good faith as an "excluder,"
that is, a phrase without general meaning that serves to exclude a wide
range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.1 3 Evading the spirit of the
deal, slacking off, willful breach, abuse of discretion, failure to cooperate,
adopting an overreaching interpretation of the contract, taking advantage of a weaker party, wrongful refusal to accept delivery, and deliberate
failure to mitigate damages have all been identified as violations of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 4 Because it addresses
such a broad range of conduct, the implied covenant has become a powerful and popular tool for policing contract performance and
enforcement. 1
Contract remedies are available for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing." Generally, these remedies provide compensation for damages suffered upon breach of contract. 7 The law seeks
to make the promisee whole, rather than compel the promisor to perform
its promise." Oliver Wendell Holmes succinctly stated the philosophy
behind contract remedies:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is,
that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 4, § 7.17, at 526.
13. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 197 (1968). An examination of
the meaning of good faith is beyond the scope of this Article. I have chosen to work with the
Summers theory due to its wide acceptance within the legal community. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 & cmt. a.
For competing theories of the good faith obligation, see Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in
the Enforcement of Contracts,73 IOWA L. REv. 299 (1988); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980);
Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an
Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1971); and B.J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL.
U. L. REv. 705 (1983).
14. See Summers, supra note 13, at 232-33, 243, 248.
15. See id at 198-99.
16. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 684, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 (1988).
17. Id at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
18. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.1, at 840.
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from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and
therefore free to break his contract if he chooses. 19
Since contract remedies have compensation-rather than punishment-as a goal, it comes as no surprise that punitive damages are not
ordinarily available for breach of contract, even in cases where breach is
deliberate or aggravated. 0 Based solely on those goals one might assume
that punitive damages could never be recovered for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
However, in the 1960s the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing began its now celebrated metamorphosis from an implied covenant actionable in contract, to a duty actionable in tort. The stage for
this dramatic development was the insurance industry.
A.

Birth of the Bad Faith Tort

In the leading case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,21 a tenant
sued her landlady, Rosina Crisci, for personal injuries allegedly resulting
from an accident suffered on the premises of her apartment building.22
Crisci had $10,000 of insurance coverage under a general liability policy
issued by Security Insurance Company (Security). 3 This policy obligated Security to defend the suit against Crisci and make any settlement
deemed expedient.24 However, Security rejected offers to settle the thirdparty claim within policy limits.2 5 When a jury returned a verdict
against Crisci for $101,000, Security paid the policy limit of $10,000,
leaving Crisci to make up the balance.2 6 Left indigent and seriously depressed, Crisci eventually sued Security for wrongful failure to settle the
claim against her.2 The trial court awarded Crisci the balance of the
19. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark D. Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
20. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1146 (1970).
21. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
22. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
23. Id at 428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
24. Id.
25. Id. As the facts of Crisci suggest, the phrase "third-party claim" refers to a claim that
a third party-that is, someone outside the contractual relationship between insured and insurer-brings against the insured. See, eg., STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONSLIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 1.06 (1992) (explaining that traditional liability coverage indemnifies insured against claims by persons not parties to insurance contract).
26. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
27. Id at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
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judgment against her, $91,000, plus $25,000 for mental suffering.2" Security appealed to the California Supreme Court.
At the time of Security's' appeal, failure to settle a third-party claim
within policy limits in an appropriate case already constituted a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which was actionable
in contract.2 9 But the California Supreme Court went even further in
Crisci, proclaiming that the action for breach of the implied covenant
sounded not only in contract, but also in tort.3 0 "Liability is imposed not
for a bad faith breach of the contract but for failure to meet the duty to
accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," the court stated.3 1 Concluding that
sufficient evidence existed to support the determination that Security had
32
breached this duty, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Crisci.
Similarly, in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. ,33 the owner of a firedamaged bar and restaurant sued his three fire insurance companies for
tortious breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 34 According to the owner, the companies had falsely implied to authorities
that he had a motive to commit arson in order to establish grounds for
refusing to pay the amounts due under the policies. 35 The trial court
sustained demurrers to the complaint and the owner appealed.36 Extending the bad faith tort to include first-party claims,37 the California
Supreme Court held that an insurer could tortiously breach its good faith
duty by unreasonably refusing to compensate its own insured for a loss
covered by its policy. 38 Concluding that the owner's complaint was sufficient to allege tortious breach of the good faith duty, the court overruled
the demurrers as to the insurance companies.39
28. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
29. See, eg., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 328 P.2d 198, 202
(1958).

30. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
31. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
32. Id at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
33. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
34. Id at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
35. Id. at 571-72, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
36. Id at 570-72, 510 P.2d at 1034-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-84.
37. As the facts of Gruenberg suggest, the phrase "first-party claim" refers to an insured's
claim against his or her insurer for compensation under his or her own insurance policy. See,
eg., ASHLEY, supra note 25, § 1.07 (explaining that insurance policies that cover first-party
claims include homeowners, health, life, and disability policies).
38. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
39. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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Although both Crisci and Gruenberg were quickly followed by
courts in several other jurisdictions,' neither case explained why breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should, in the in-

surance context, sound in tort as well as contract.41 This omission is
particularly disappointing given the significant differences in contract

and tort policy objectives. Contract remedies provide compensation; tort
remedies provide compensation and serve a deterrent and retributive
function.42 Tort liability encourages potential defendants to prevent the
40. Most jurisdictions have recognized a bad faith tort for failure to settle a third-party
claim against the insured. See, eg., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 367 A.2d
864, 867 (N.J. 1976); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 849, 854 (N.Y. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
Several jurisdictions have followed California's lead in extending the bad faith tort to
include unreasonable denial of the insured's first-party claim against the insurer. See, eg.,
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Alaska 1989); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375-76 (Wis. 1978). But see Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Mich. 1980); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701
P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).
41. The Crisci court emphasized that the insured had entered into the insurance contract,
not to obtain a commercial advantage, but rather to obtain peace of mind and security in the
event of an accidental loss. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
However, the court advanced this purpose not to explain why bad faith conduct was tortious,
but to explain why damages for mental suffering were appropriate in that case. Id.
Similarly, in the later case of Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d
141, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. 691 (1979), cerL denied and appealdismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980),
the California Supreme Court emphasized that the insured had purchased disability insurance
to provide peace of mind and security in the event he was unable to work. Again, however,
this purpose was advanced to explain why failure to investigate the insured's claim constituted
a breach of the implied covenant, and not why breach of the implied covenant sounded in tort.
Id at 818-19, 620 P.2d at 145-46, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. at 695-96.
The Egan court also noted that the insurer and insured enjoyed a "special relationship."
Id at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. at 696. The court explained that, because the
insurer was supplying a service affecting the public interest, its obligation of good faith and fair
dealing included "qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary." Id (citation omitted). Moreover, the relationship of insurer and insured was inherently
unbalanced due to the "adhesive nature of insurance contracts." Id. The only purpose of this
discussion, however, was to justify an award of punitive damages under California statutory
law. See id, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. at 696-97. Some years later, the California
Supreme Court recharacterized its own reasoning in Egan as describing some of the bases for
permitting tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant in the insurance context. See
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 684-85, 765 P.2d 373, 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
228-29 (1988).
42. Some scholars have suggested that contract damages can also serve to deter and punish
breach of contract. "[C]ontract damages not only compensate for pecuniary loss, but also
operate as a substitute for personal vengeance and act to deter other contract breaches."
Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damagesin the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of
Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. Rnv. 207, 219 (1977) (footnote omitted); see also 5 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1002, at 33-35 (1964) (discussing rules of law policy providing for breach of contract damages). However, while contract damages may have the effect
of deterring or punishing some breaches of contract, they are not designed to achieve these
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occurrence of harm and punishes wrongdoers for their violation of community norms. 43 These twin goals-deterrence and retribution-are
most clearly reflected in the availability of punitive damages for tortious
conduct.' Although punitive damages cannot be recovered for breach of
contract, 45 they can be awarded in tort for conduct that is outrageous
because of the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the
rights of others.' Thus, by developing the bad faith tort to redress outrageous behavior within a contractual relationship, the courts opened the
door to recovery of punitive damages-an opportunity that plaintiffs did
not ignore.
The next important application of the bad faith tort involved the
employment arena. In 1980 the California Court of Appeal decided
Cleary v. American Airlines. 7 There, an employer discharged an employee after eighteen years of service, allegedly as retaliation for participation in union activities. 4 The employee sued, asserting inter alia a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.49
The trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim,"0 but the court of
appeal reversed, holding that the employee had pleaded a viable cause of
action.51 The court reasoned that, given the length of the employee's
service and the employer's failure to follow its own procedures for adjudicating employee disputes, termination without legal cause constituted a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 2 Citing to
insurance cases such as Gruenberg,but without engaging in any comparative analysis of insurance and employment relationships, the Cleary
court concluded that the employee's claim sounded in both contract and
tort.5 3 Once Cleary was decided, the California Court of Appeal issued
ends. See Farnsworth, supra note 20, at 1146. Thus, it is reasonable to characterize compensation as the primary objective of contract remedies.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25-26 (5th ed. 1984).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1); KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 2,
at 9.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); see FARNSWORTH, supra note

4, § 12.8, at 874.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2); KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 2, at
9-10.
47. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
48. Id at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
at 456-57, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
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other decisions recognizing the bad faith tort in the employment
54
context.
While some states, such as Montana and Nevada, joined California

in recognizing the bad faith tort in the employment context, 55 others refused to do so.5 6 For example, in Martin v. FederalLife Insurance Co. ,5

an employee sued for damages allegedly caused by his wrongful discharge, asserting inter alia a claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." The trial court dismissed this
claim for failure to state a cause of action, and the Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed, holding that Illinois law did not recognize a tort remedy

based on an employer's bad faith breach of the implied covenant.

9

The

court reasoned that "[c]are must be taken to prevent the transmutation

of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through the
bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair
dealing."'

Judicial enthusiasm for the bad faith tort reached new heights in
1984, when the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Seaman's

Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co.61 Seaman's, a ship supply
dealer, wanted to lease part of a marina from the City of Eureka.6 2 Realizing that approval of the lease depended on its ability to operate a
marine fuel dealership with modernized fueling equipment, Seaman's entered into an agreement with Standard, a major oil company, for the

supply of its fuel requirements.63 The city granted the lease."

Shortly

thereafter, an oil shortage developed and the federal government issued

regulations requiring suppliers to continue providing fuel to existing cus54. See, eg., Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860,
867 (1985); see also Harmon Eng'g v. Reim, 126 Cal. App. 3d 415, 427, 179 Cal. Rptr. 78, 84
(1981) (holding that once relationship between employee and employer matures into relationship between pensioner and trustee of pension fund, breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing sounds in tort).
55. See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Mont. 1984); Gates
v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 215 (Mont. 1983); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d
1364, 1370-73 (Nev. 1987).
56. See, eg., Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska 1988); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038-40 (Ariz. 1985); Martin v. Federal
Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
57. 440 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
58. d at 1006.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
62. Id at 759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
63. Id. at 759-60, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
64. Id. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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tomers.65 Considering itself such a customer, Seaman's applied to the
responsible federal agency for an order directing Standard to continue
providing fuel to Seaman's. 6 Following a series of decisions and appeals,
the agency decreed that a supply order would be issued when Seaman's
produced a court decree stating that a valid contract existed between it
and Standard.67 Seaman's asked Standard to stipulate to the existence of
a contract because it could not survive without fuel throughout a lengthy
trial.68 Standard's representative laughed and said, "'See you in
court.' "69 Forced to discontinue its operations, Seaman's asserted several claims against Standard, including a claim for tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.7 0 The jury returned a
verdict for Seaman's on the bad faith tort claim, 7 1 but the court of appeal
reversed the judgment. 72 Standard appealed from the judgment and Seaman's filed a cross-appeal.7 3
As the California Supreme Court recognized, the major issue raised
by the appeal was whether breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in a commercial contract could give rise to an action in
tort.7' A tort action was available for breach of the covenant in an insurance contract, the court emphasized, because there was a "special relationship between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public
interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." 75 No doubt there were
similar relationships deserving similar legal treatment. However, courts
must be careful when deciding whether or not to apply tort remedies in a
commercial context.
When we move from such special relationships to consideration of the tort remedy in the context of the ordinary commercial contract, we move into largely uncharted and
potentially dangerous waters. Here, parties of roughly equal
65. Id at 760-61, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
66. Id at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
67. Id., 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
68. Id. at 761-62, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
69. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
70. Id
71. Id. In order to fend off the oil company's motion for a new trial, Seaman's later consented to the reduction of these punitive damages to one million dollars. Id.
72. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 126 (1982), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
73. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
358.
74. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
75. Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (citing Egan v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. 691, 696 (1979), cert.
denied and appealdismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980)).
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bargaining power are free to shape the contours of their agreement ....In such contracts, it may be difficult to distinguish
between breach of the covenant and breach of contract, and
there is the risk that interjecting tort remedies will intrude upon
the expectations of the parties. This is not to say that tort remedies have no place in such a commercial context, but that it is
wise to proceed with caution in determining their scope and
application.7 6
Proceeding with such caution, the court refused to address the
broad question of whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in a commercial contract sounded in tort, reasoning that
it was not even necessary to base liability upon a breach of the implied
covenant as such.7 7 It was enough to recognize that a party could incur
tort remedies when, in addition to breaching a contract, it sought to
"shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable
cause, that the contract exist[ed]."17 "Such conduct goes beyond the
mere breach of contract," the court opined. 79 "It offends accepted notions of business ethics."8 0 In such a situation, the court continued,
"[a]cceptance of tort remedies [was] not likely to intrude upon the bargaining relationship or upset reasonable expections [sic] of the contracting parties."8 " Concluding that the trial court had failed to properly
instruct the jury regarding the necessity of bad faith denial, the court
reversed the judgment for Seaman's on the bad faith tort claim and remanded for further proceedings.8 2
The legal community was not persuaded by the California Supreme
Court's protestations regarding the limited nature of its holding in Seaman's. As one commentator noted, bad faith denial of the existence of a
contract was simply a form of the tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and not a separate tort.83 Moreover, there
was little difference between bad faith denial of the existence of a contract and bad faith assertion of any other defense to liability. Thus, with
little effort, a plaintiff could use the reasoning in Seaman's to recast vir76. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
77. Id, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
80. Id. (citing Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. 1976)).
81. Id.
82. Id at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
83. See Eileen A. Scallen, Comment, Sailing the UnchartedSeas of Bad Faith: Seaman's
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REv. 1161, 1165-76 (1985).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:483

tually any contested breach of contract as a tort. 4 Not surprisingly then,
despite its seemingly narrow holding, the Seaman's decision fueled widespread speculation that the courts might soon extend the claim for tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the commercial
context, thereby eliminating the line between breach of contract and
85
tort.
In fact, California courts quickly seized upon the dictum in Seaman's that the bad faith tort could properly be applied where there was a
special relationship comparable to that between insurer and insured.
One of the most influential of these post-Seaman's cases was Wallis v.
Superior Court. 6 In that case, a fifty-five-year-old employee learned that
his employer planned to close the furniture manufacturing plant where
he worked. 7 Before he left the company, he entered into a contract with
his employer, exchanging his promise not to compete for the employer's
promise to pay him a monthly stipend until he reached age sixty-five and
could begin drawing his accrued pension benefits.8 8 The employer then
closed the plant and the employee was laid off.8 9 For three years, the
employer made the payments.9" However, when business took a turn for
the worse, it sent the employee a letter, stating that the "gratuitous" payments would be terminated." The employee sued, asserting inter alia a
claim for tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 92
When the trial court sustained the employer's demurrer to this claim, the
employee appealed. 9a
84. See C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not
Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling",21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 459 (1987); Michael
Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the Seaman's Case, 8
Bus. L. NEws 1, 11 (1984); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract:
The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenantof Good Faith and FairDealing into
the CommercialRealm, 86 COLUM. L. Rv. 377, 401 (1986).
85. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Good Faith and FairDealing in Commercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237,
1237-38 (1989); Putz & Klippen, supra note 84, at 419; Raymone Wallenstein, Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in Commercial Contracts: A Wrong in
Search of a Remedy, 20 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 113 (1989); Jill P. Anderson, Note, Lender
Liabilityfor Breach of the Obligationof Good Faith Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 957-66
(1987); Brad Schacht, Note, Bad Faith Lenders, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 417 (1989).
86. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
87. Id at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id at 1113-14, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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To determine whether the employee had stated a valid cause of action, the California Court of Appeal scrutinized the insurance relationship.94 It identified five characteristics of a special relationship sufficient
to justify imposition of tort liability for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing.95 The importance of these characteristics to subsequent
analysis requires their enumeration here:
(1) [T]he contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a nonprofit motivation, i.e., to secure
peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract
damages are not adequate, because (a) they do not require the
party in the superior position to account for its actions, and (b)
they do not make the inferior party "whole"; (4) one party is
especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may suffer
and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform; and
(5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability. 96
Applying this five-part test to the facts before it, the Wallis court
found that the employee and employer enjoyed such a special relationship. First, the parties were in inherently unequal bargaining positions
because the employee needed money and had few skills outside the furniture manufacturing area. 97 Second, the employee entered into the contract to obtain financial security and peace of mind. 98 Third, ordinary
contract damages were not adequate because they offered no incentive for
the employer not to breach; if the employee obtained a judgment for
mere breach of contract, the employer would only have to pay what it
owed anyway. 99 Contract damages were inadequate for another reason:
The employee's immediate precarious financial position due to termination of payments could not be remedied by a lump-sum payment received
several years later." Fourth, the employee was in an extremely vulnerable position because of his age, lack of other work skills, and financial
responsibilities. Finally, the employer was aware of the employee's vulnerable position.10 1 Since there was a special relationship between the
parties, the court concluded, the employee had stated a valid claim for
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id at 1116-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127-30.
Id at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
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tortious breach of the implied covenant of good10faith
and fair dealing,
2
and the employer's demurrer must be overruled.
The California Court of Appeal used the special relationship theory
to extend tort liability still further when it decided Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United CaliforniaBank.103 That case involved a bank and a depositor that maintained a commercial checking account with the bank."°
Having negligently charged the depositor's account for a forged check,
the bank refused to recredit the account, asserting as a defense a statute
of limitations that bank counsel knew was inapplicable.10° At trial the
depositor was awarded $100,000 in punitive damages on its claim for
tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.10 6 The court of
appeal affirmed, holding that the relationship between bank and depositor was at least "quasi-fiduciary."" 0 7 Thus, the depositor could reasonably expect the bank not to raise nonexistent legal defenses after
negligently disbursing entrusted funds.108
Commercial Cotton represented the high-water mark in the history
of the bad faith tort in California. Until that decision the relationship
between depositor and bank was considered to be at arm's length, with
the depositor acting as creditor and the bank as debtor to the extent of
the deposited funds.10 9 The sudden characterization of the depositorbank relationship as "quasi-fiduciary" ran directly counter to the well110
established rule that a debtor-creditor relationship was not fiduciary,
and sent shock waves throughout the commercial world.1 '
While California boldly went where no court had gone before, other
states continued to demonstrate little enthusiasm for the bad faith tort.
Oklahoma refused to recognize the tort in the commercial lending con102. Id., 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30.
103. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
104. Id at 514, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
105. Id at 514-15, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
106. Id at 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
107. Id at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
108. Id
109. See, e.g., Morse v. Crocker Natl Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839,
842 (1983); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1961).
110. See 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 12.1 (4th
ed. 1987).
111. See, e.g., N.E. Bettsworth, Note, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California BankCalifornia'sNewest Extension of Bad Faith Litigation into Commercial Law, 16 Sw.U. L.
Rnv. 645 (1986); Kenneth W. Curtis, Comment, The FiduciaryControversy: Injection ofFiduciary Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 795 (1987).
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text," 2 as did Nevada in the commercial leasing context."' Alabama
and Arizona rejected tort remedies for bad faith breach of contracts for
the sale of goods and real estate, respectively." 4 Only Montana continued to follow California's lead, extending the tort to deposit' 15 and
loan" 6 contracts.
Eventually, Montana took the leap that even California had been
unwilling to take, extending the tort to commercial contracts unsullied
by any hint of a special relationship. In Nicholson v. United Pacific In-

surance Co. ,"' a commercial lessor alleged that the lessee had rescinded
the lease agreement without justification and in tortious breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing."' The jury returned a verdict for the
lessor, and the lessee appealed."

9

The Montana Supreme Court af-

firmed, holding that one party could assert a bad faith tort claim whenever the other party frustrated its justifiable expectations under the

contract by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. 20 Montana
cases following Nicholson recognized claims for tortious breach of a commercial franchise agreement' 2 ' and of a contract for the sale of a
22
business.'
B.

The Death of the Bad Faith Tort

Meanwhile, the winds of political change had begun to blow. As
early as 1978 Californians responded to a frightening increase in violent
crime by passing an initiative imposing the death penalty for certain
homicides.' 23 But the California Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Rose Bird, persistently overturned nearly all death verdicts.124 In
112. See Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Okla. 1988).
113. See Aluevich v. Harrah's, 660 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1006

(1984).
114. See Kennedy Elec. Co. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So. 2d 76, 81 (Ala. 1983);
Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765 P.2d 531, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).

115. Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419 (Mont. 1985).
116. See First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984).
117. 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
118. IdL at 1343.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1348.
121. See Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Mont. 1986).
122. See McGregor v. Mommer, 714 P.2d 536, 543 (Mont. 1986).
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988). A 72% majority of the electorate passed
the initiative. Ed Salzman, Election '78 Post-Mortem, 9 CAL. J. 386, 390 (1978); see also Howard J. Schwab, The History of the Death Penalty in California,L.A. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 8, 13.
124. From 1979 through 1986 the California Supreme Court reviewed 64 death verdicts,
affirming only five (7.8%). Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the
Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 237, 237 (1989).
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1986, angered by this apparent refusal to carry out the popular will, the
public voted Chief Justice Bird and two other justices out of office. 12 5 In
1987 then-Governor George Dukemejian, an avowed conservative, appointed three new justices as replacements and elevated fellow conservative Justice Malcom Lucas to the position of Chief Justice. 2 6
This change in court membership had the desired effect: The California Supreme Court immediately began to affirm most death verdicts. 2 7 But the change in court membership had another, perhaps
unintended, effect: California's enthusiasm for the bad faith tort began to
subside.
The pivotal case was Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,12 decided in
1988. In that case a terminated employee sued his former employer, alleging tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.129 The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, the
court of appeal affirmed, and the employee appealed to the California
130
Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court began its opinion by emphasizing the
traditional distinction between contract and tort.1 31 The court reasoned
that the original purpose of the implied covenant of good faith was to
protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to effectuate some general public policy.1 32 Thus, cases recognizing a claim for
tortious breach of the implied covenant in the insurance context represented a major departure from traditional contract principles.133 Further
extensions of the exceptional approach taken in those cases must be con13 4
sidered with great care.
The court, assuming arguendo that the special relationship model
was the correct one to follow in deciding whether to extend tort remedies, proceeded to compare the insurance and employment relationships.1 35 The court made three distinctions. First, since no other insurer
will cover a loss once incurred, bad faith denial of coverage forces the
insured to bear the entire loss. By contrast, a wrongfully terminated em125. See id. at 238.
126. Id.
127. From 1987 through March 1989 the California Supreme Court reviewed 71 death verdicts, affTrming 51 verdicts (71.8%). Id. at 237.
128. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
129. Id. at 662, 765 P.2d at 374, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 682-83, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
132. Id. at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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ployee can mitigate its loss by seeking alternative employment. 13 6 Second, an insurer provides a quasi-public service by selling protection

against potential economic loss to individuals seeking financial security.
In contrast, "[t]he employer does not similarly 'sell' protection to its em-

ployees; it is not providing a public service. Nor do we find convincing
the idea that the employee is necessarily seeking a different kind of finan-

cial security than those entering a typical commercial contract.

' 137

Fi-

nally, in the insurance context the insurer and insured are financially at

odds, since payment of a claim shifts money from the insurer to the insured or a third-party claimant.1 38 In contrast, the interests of the emaligned, since it is in the employer's
ployer and employee are generally
1 39

interest to retain the employee.
Thus, the court concluded, the employment relationship was not

sufficiently similar to that between insurer and insured to warrant extension of tort remedies, particularly in light of countervailing concerns
about economic policy and stability, the traditional separation of tort and

contract law, and numerous protections against improper terminations
already afforded employees. 4

Breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing in an employment contract did not sound in tort.41
After Foley lower California courts quickly moved to limit the bad
faith tort, holding that it did not apply to commercial lending1 42 or dealership1 4 3 contracts. Significantly, the California Court of Appeal expressly repudiated its earlier decision in Commercial Cotton, holding that

the bank-depositor relationship was not quasi-fiduciary, and did not give
rise to tort damages when an implied covenant of good faith was

broken. 144
136. Id., 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
137. Id.
138. IL at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
139. Id.
140. Id., 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
141. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
142. See Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1400,
272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403 (1990); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 735, 741 (1989); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 731-32, 260
Cal. Rptr. 793, 796-97 (1989).
143. See Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 415, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 28 (1988); see
also Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J.Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431, 1439 (E.D. Cal. 1986)
(holding no special relationship between wine distributor and supplier that would support bad
faith tort claim for termination of distributorship), aft'd, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 694, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 348 (1991)
("Since appending the quasi-fiduciary label to the ordinary bank-depositor relationship runs
counter to both pre- and post-Commercial Cotton authority.. . we no longer approve the
denomination of the ordinary bank-depositor relationship as quasi-fiduciary in character.").
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Sensing the new attitude in California, Montana began to rethink
the proper role of the bad faith tort. In Story v. City of Bozeman,14 the

Supreme Court of Montana reversed a verdict for tortious breach of a
construction contract.146 Nicholson had gone too far in extending the
bad faith tort to all contracts, the court reasoned; rather, the special rela-

tionship defined in Wallis must be present before breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing could sound in tort. 47 Working
with this new standard, the Montana Supreme Court later held that a
commercial borrower and lender did not enjoy the special relationship
necessary to support a bad faith tort claim. 4
Post-Foley decisions in other states hammered more nails into the
coffin of the bad faith tort. Idaho, New Jersey, and Utah joined the ranks
of states rejecting the tort in the employment context. 14 9 Other states,
including Colorado, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas, repudiated the
tort in several other contexts, such as lending, 15 0 limited partnership,1 51
distributorship,1 5 2 guaranties,1 5 3 and letters of credit.1 4 By the 1990s,
the only area in which the bad faith tort retained any vitality was
insurance. 155
In sum, it is easy to describe the history of the bad faith tort. The
claim was born in the insurance context, experienced a sudden spurt of
145. 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990).
146. Id at 777.
147. Id. at 775-76.
148. See First See. Bank & Trust v. VZ Ranch, 807 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Mont. 1991).
149. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Idaho 1989); Noye v. Hoffmarm-La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 218
(N.J. 1990); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Utah 1989).
150. See Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d 841, 864 (Idaho
1991); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 804 P.2d 900, 905
(Idaho 1991); Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 842 (S.D. 1990).
151. Friedman v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 825 P.2d 1033, 1042-43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993).
152. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477,481 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). Interestingly, Texas law does not impose a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract, recognizing the duty only in special relationships marked by shared trust or imbalance in bargaining power. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09
(Tex. 1990). Once the duty is imposed, however, its breach sounds in tort, allowing recovery
of both actual and punitive damages. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Tex. 1987).
153. See Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 709.
154. See Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. v. General Bank, 751 F. Supp. 179, 184 (D. Or.
1990); Esso Petroleum Canada v. Security Pac. Bank, 710 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D. Or. 1989).
155. See, eg., Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990);
Norman v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 555 N.E.2d 1087, 1111 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526 (Wash. 1990); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins.
Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990).
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growth in areas like employment and banking, and then-just as suddenly--died a quiet death in every field but insurance. I now analyze the
cases more thoroughly, to identify the policy implications of this history
and put Gilmore's theory to the test.
II. THE QUASI-FIDUCIARY MODEL OF CONTRACT
The history of the bad faith tort raises some difficult questions.
Why did contract shade into tort, and then, like a chameleon, change
back again? Why did the courts impose remedies that sought to deter
and punish breach of contract, only to return to traditional remedies
seeking to provide only compensation?
To present definitive answers to the preceding questions is impossible without traveling back in time and entering the minds of the judges
who wrote the bad faith tort into existence and then oblivion. This, of
course, I cannot do. However, even if I cannot demonstrate with certainty why the courts developed and then abandoned the bad faith tort, I
can at least study the artifacts of their decision-making process-that is,
their written opinions-in an effort to identify the policy implications of
the birth and death of the bad faithtort. This analysis will enable us to
critique Gilmore's theories regarding the social, political, and historical
ramifications of the death of contract.
A.

Theories of the FiduciaryRelationship

One of the most striking features of the many decisions involving the
bad faith tort is the emphasis on the presence or absence of a special
relationship between the contracting parties. By itself the term "special
relationship" is not particularly enlightening, since a contractual relationship could be special in a variety of different ways. However, review
of insurance cases reveals that some courts have openly characterized the
relationship between an insurer and insured as "fiduciary" or "quasi-fiduciary." 156 And, in Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California
156. See, eg., Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141-42 (Colo. 1984) (en
banc); Noye v. Hoffinann-La Roche Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (dictum), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990); see also William M. Goodman & Thom G.
Seaton, Foreword: Ripefor Decision, Internal Workings and CurrentConcerns of the California
Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REv. 309, 347 (1974) (characterizing insurers as fiduciaries with
special responsibilities).
In an interesting recent decision, a California Court of Appeal held that an insurer is not a
true fiduciary, but admitted that the relationship between the insurer and insured is akin to a
fiduciary relationship. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1148-49, 271 Cal.

Rptr. 246, 252-53 (1990).
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Bank,1 7 the California Court of Appeal affirmed a bad faith tort judgment on the express ground that the relationship between a depositor and
its bank was quasi-fiduciary.'
Therefore, I must investigate the possibility that the special relationship is a kind of fiduciary relationship, or at
least similar enough to be described as quasi-fiduciary.
Although the wide variety of fiduciary relationships makes generalization difficult,15 9 two commonly asserted theories of the relationship
are particularly relevant here."6 The reliance theory holds that a fiduciary relationship exists where one person-the beneficiary-reposes trust,
confidence, or reliance in another-the fiduciary. 6 As one scholar has
noted, trust, confidence, and reliance are independent ideas; yet, at the
same time, each concept carries with it a sense of the beneficiary's vulnerability. 6 2 Courts often supplement the reliance theory with the requirement that the fiduciary know of the beneficiary's trust, confidence, or

reliance. 163
The unequal relationshiptheory, which tends to follow from the reliance theory, teaches that a fiduciary relationship exists when there is inequality between two persons. 16 Though sometimes narrowly conceived
as an imbalance of bargaining power, this inequality is more accurately
defined in general terms as a special vulnerability of one person to another.16 - Thus, even though two people have the same bargaining power
and enter into the fiduciary relationship as equals, the very nature of the
relationship may cause the fiduciary to assume a dominant position with
66
respect to the beneficiary.1
157. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
158. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
159. Three traditional categories of fiduciary relationships have been identified: (1) the fiduciary who holds or manages property on behalf of another, such as a trustee; (2) the fiduciary who acts as a representative for another, such as an agent; and (3) the fiduciary who
advises, such as a lawyer, doctor, or minister. J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 2132 (1981). Modem times have added other fiduciaries, such as the majority shareholder of a
corporation, who fall outside these traditional categories. Id. at 32-35.
160. I have chosen to use these commonly asserted theories of the fiduciary relationship as
helpful diagnostic tools in interpreting the meaning of certain key phrases in bad faith tort
cases. I realize that both theories have been criticized on a variety of descriptive and prescriptive grounds; I do not mean to adopt them as adequate theories of the fiduciary relationship.
See id. at 56-64.
161. Id. at 56; see also ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955) (stating that doctrine of
fiduciary relationship embraces all those who are placed in any position of trust).
162. SHEPHERD, supra note 159, at 57.

163. Id. at 60.
164. Id. at 61.

165. Id. at 60.
166. Id. at 62.
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B. Development of a Quasi-FiduciaryModel of Contract
1. The early cases
The insurance cases provide a good starting point for analysis of the
case law in light of these two theories of fiduciary relationships.
Although early cases such as Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 167 and
Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co. 6 8 often did not explain why breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should sound in tort,
recent decisions have identified several factors justifying recognition of
the bad faith tort within the insurance context.
The first relevant factor is the motivation of the insured in purchasing the insurance.1 69 As the insurer is well aware, the insured does not
seek commercial advantage, but rather the peace of mind and financial
security that insurance provides in case of accidental loss. x7 0 Translating
this reasoning into the language of fiduciary theory, the insured reposes
trust, confidence, and reliance in the insurer to protect against accidental
loss; and the insurer is aware of this reliance. Thus, the first factor
evokes the reliance theory of the fiduciary relationship.
The second relevant factor is the vulnerability of the insured should
accidental loss occur. 17 1 Since an insured can no longer purchase substitute insurance after an accident occurs, insureds must depend upon the
good faith performance of their insurers.' 72 Interpreting this reasoning
in light of fiduciary theory, the fact that the insured must rely upon the
insurer to perform recalls the reliance theory of the fiduciary relationship. At the same time the utter dependence of the insured upon the
insurer reflects a power imbalance inherent in the nature of the insurance
contract, evoking the unequal relationship theory of the fiduciary
relationship.
The third and final relevant factor is the great disparity in economic
strength and bargaining ability between the insurer and insured. 1 73 This
imbalance in bargaining power at the outset of the relationship reflects
another aspect of the unequal relationship theory of the fiduciary
relationship.
167. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
168. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
169. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1984).
170. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 690, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 234 (1988); Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
171. See Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
172. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234; Walls, 160 Cal.
App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
173. See Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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Reviewing those cases that extended the bad faith tort beyond the
insurance context, I find more reasoning consistent with the reliance and
unequal relationship theories of the fiduciary relationship. Consider, for
example, K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock.1 4 There, in an attempt to evade its
obligation to pay retirement benefits, an employer fired a tenured employee six months before his retirement benefits would have vested. 1 "
The employee responded by alleging breach of contract and tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.17 6 A jury awarded
the employee a generous measure of both compensatory and punitive
1 77
damages, and the employer appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that tort remedies were appropriate only when there was a special relationship between the parties
marked by certain characteristics, including a "superior-inferior power
differential" creating a "special element of reliance." 17 The court found
this power differential and special reliance woven into the very fabric of
the modem employment relationship:
"We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people
have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose
their jobs they lose every resource except for the relief supplied
by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the
mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something new in the world. Forourgeneration, the substance of life
179
is in another man's hands."
The employee had relied upon the employer's promise to retain him,
the court reasoned, just as an insured relies upon the insurer's promise of
indemnity. 180 Given the special relationship of trust between the parties,
the employer's abusive and arbitrary dismissal of the employee demanded a remedy that went beyond traditional contract damages." 8 Accordingly, the award of bad faith tort damages was proper, and must be
182
affirmed.
Reading the above case through the prism of fiduciary theory, the
emphasis upon the economic dependency of the modem employee re174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
Id at 1365.
Id
Id at 1368-73.
Id at 1370-71.
Id at 1372 (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951)).
Id
Id
Id at 1373.
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flects concern about a power imbalance inherent in the nature of the
employment relationship. Given this imbalance, the employment relationship is somewhat similar-if not identical-to a fiduciary relationship as conceived under the unequal relationship theory. At the same
time the emphasis upon the special relationship of trust between the employee and employer calls to mind the reliance theory of the fiduciary
relationship.
Similarly, in the Wallis v. Superior Court case, the California Court
of Appeal employed reasoning consistent with the reliance and unequal
relationship theories of the fiduciary relationship. There, an employer
had contracted to provide a former employee with monthly support stipends, but later reneged on its promise.1" 3 Applying its five-part special
relationship test, the court concluded that the former employee could
assert a bad faith tort claim.'" 4
Working with the first prong of the test, the court reasoned that the
parties were in inherently unequal bargaining positions when the contract was made, since the former employee needed the stipend and had
few marketable skills.1" 5 By stressing this imbalance in bargaining
power, the court unconsciously evoked the unequal relationship theory
of the fiduciary relationship. Continuing, the court found that the second prong of the special relationship test was also satisfied; the former
employee had entered into the contract for the payment of a monthly
stipend to obtain financial security and peace of mind.' 8 6 This reasoning,
which stressed the employee's reliance upon his former employer to safeguard him from harm, brings to mind the reliance theory of the fiduciary
relationship.
The third prong of the special relationship test is not relevant
here, l" 7 but the fourth and fifth prongs are. The court emphasized that
the former employee was extremely vulnerable to harm upon breach due
to his advanced age, lack of other work skills, and financial responsibilities. 8 8 Moreover, the employer was well aware of this vulnerability. 8 9
Again, the emphasis upon the extent to which the former employee relied
upon the employer to perform, and the employer's knowledge of this reliance, is consistent with the reliance theory of the fiduciary relationship.
At the same time the employee's vulnerability to his former employer
183. See Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
184. See id. at 1118-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
185. Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id
Consideration of the third prong is deferred to infra part III.
Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Id
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reflects a power imbalance inherent in their contractual relationship.
Thus, the court's analysis of the fourth and fifth prongs also evokes the
unequal relationship theory of the fiduciary relationship.
The logic of the controversial decision in Commercial Cotton Co. v.
United CaliforniaBank also resonates with fiduciary theory. There, the
California Court of Appeal affirmed a bad faith tort judgment on the
basis that the relationship between a commercial depositor and its bank
was "quasi-fiduciary."' 19 Banking and insurance have much in common,
the court noted, since both are highly regulated industries performing
vital public services affecting the public welfare. 191 Moreover, the depositor was completely dependent on the bank, relying on its honesty and
expertise to protect deposited funds. 192 He maintained the account for
two reasons: the convenience of transacting business without cash and
the security of having the bank safeguard deposited funds. 193 This language, identifying security as the motivation for entering the deposit contract, is consistent with the reliance theory of the fiduciary relationship.
Just as California and Nevada used the quasi-fiduciary model of
contract as a basis for extending the bad faith tort beyond the insurance
field, other states declined to extend the bad faith tort to situations where
the quasi-fiduciary model did not seem to fit. Some decisions emphasized
the absence of the trust, confidence, or reliance so characteristic of the
fiduciary relationship. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
noted that the purpose of a commercial loan was not to provide security,
but rather to facilitate risk taking in business.194 Similarly, the Arizona
Court of Appeals opined that the purpose behind a home purchase was
not security, but rather the acquisition of a tangible asset. 195 Other decisions stressed the lack of any inequality of position between the parties.
Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court declined to extend tort remedies to a
commercial lessor who was "an experienced business person and an
96
attorney."
To summarize the analysis so far, the cases that developed and extended the bad faith tort demonstrated a strong tendency to emphasize
attributes of the contractual relationships before them that were consis190. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 551, 554 (1985).

191. Id
192. Id.
193.
194.
195.
196.
(1984).

Id
See Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1988).
See Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765 P.2d 531, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
See Aluevich v. Harrah's, 660 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006

January 1994]

GILMORE SPOKE TOO SOON

tent with the salient characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, such as
(1) the trust, confidence, and reliance that one party placed in the other,
and (2) inequality between the parties, whether existing at the time the
contract was made or arising later as an incident of the contractual
relationship.
Furthermore, once the presence of a special relationship was established, the courts defined the good faith obligation so that it began to
approach a fiduciary obligation. Under classical fiduciary doctrine, fiduciaries owe a duty of loyalty; they must act solely in the best interests of
their charges, without regard to their own interests. 197 In cases recognizing the bad faith tort, the courts held the stronger contracting party to a
similar, though not identical, standard: The stronger party was required
to give the best interests of the weaker party at least as much consideration as its own. 198 As the Wallis court put it, the stronger contracting
party has "a heightened duty not to act unreasonably in breaching the
contract, and to consider the interest of the other party as tantamount to
9
its own.

' ' 19

In theory, the stronger contracting party had less obligation than
the fiduciary, since it was not required to abandon its own interests altogether. In practice, however, the good faith obligation came closer to the
fiduciary duty of loyalty. For example, the financial interests of an insurer and its insured are always at odds, since payment of a claim simply
shifts money from insurer to the insured or a third-party claimant.2"
Due to this inherent conflict, the insurer cannot give the financial interests of the insured the same consideration as its own. Rather, it must
either put its own financial interests first-thereby violating the good
faith obligation-or place the insured's financial interests ahead of its
own, as a fiduciary would be required to do.
The foregoing analysis shows that the rise of the bad faith tort was
founded in part upon the judicial invention of a new model of contract.
This model stressed attributes of the contractual relationship that were
comparable to characteristics of the fiduciary relationship, and imposed a
197. See, eg., GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRuSTS § 95 (6th ed. 1987) (trustee must administer
trust solely in interest of beneficiaries); 2A Scowt & FRATCHER, supra note 110, § 170 (same);
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957) (noting agent has duty to act
solely for benefit of principal); HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HAND-

BOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 4 (1979) (same).
198. See, eg., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 620 P.2d 141,
145, 169 Cal. Rptr. Supp. 691, 695 (1979), cert denied and appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1109, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974).
199. Wallis, 160 Cal. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
200. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:483

good faith obligation upon the stronger contracting party that was similar to the duty of loyalty imposed upon the fiduciary. Although the new
model could not be classified as a true fiduciary relationship, the courts'
frequent-though sometimes unconscious-analogies to fiduciary theory
suggest that the model is best described as quasi-fiduciary;that is, similar
or akin to a fiduciary relationship. 0 1
2.

Implications of the early cases

Concluding that the early bad faith tort decisions were based upon a
quasi-fiduciary model of contract does not end my inquiry. Fiduciary
law must be analyzed in greater depth to ascertain the policy foundation
of the quasi-fiduciary model.
Professor Tamar Frankel has described the moral foundation of fiduciary law as "altruism": "The moral person serves other members of
the society and contributes to society generally. ' ' 2 2 Frankel speculates
that a possible reason for the judicial incorporation of altruism into fiduciary law is vulnerability.
[Ihe moral posture of fiduciaries is related to the vulnerability
of the entrustor. It is wrong to injure anyone. But it is more
reprehensible to injure someone who cannot protect himself, as
an entrustor in a fiduciary relation is. Thus, the degree of
moral culpability of the fiduciary is positively related to the extent of the entrustor's helplessness.20 3
Frankel's theory of the moral foundation of fiduciary law is relevant
to my analysis because it is consistent with the reasoning employed in the
early bad faith tort cases. As I have shown, the quasi-fiduciary model of
contract emphasized the reliance of the weaker contracting party upon
the stronger, or the imbalance of power between the parties-that is, factors revealing the vulnerability of the weaker party. Reasoning by analogy to Frankel, such vulnerability would provide the necessary
foundation for the incorporation of altruism into contract law via the
quasi-fiduciary model. Moreover, the quasi-fiduciary model required the
stronger contracting party to give the interests of the weaker party at
least as much consideration as its own. Thus, the stronger contracting
party had a special responsibility for the welfare of the weaker party-it
was required to act as its brother's keeper. Reasoning by analogy to
201. See, eg., Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1147-49, 271 Cal. Rptr. 246,
251-53 (1990) (noting that insurer is not true fiduciary, but relationship between insurer and
insured is akin to fiduciary relationship).
202. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 830 (1983).
203. Id.at 832.
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Frankel, the quasi-fiduciary model demanded that the stronger contracting party act altruistically, serving the weaker party, perhaps even at
its own expense.
Accepting altruism as the foundation of the quasi-fiduciary model of
contract, it is clear why courts imposed tort remedies for bad faith
breach of contract. If the stronger contracting party had an altruistic
obligation to perform for the benefit of the weaker party, then bad faith
breach must have appeared as an unacceptably selfish and, therefore, immoral act. Tort remedies served to deter and punish this immoral
conduct.
Having completed analysis of the quasi-fiduciary model, I am ready
to comment on Gilmore's theory of the death of contract. Recall that
Gilmore had characterized classical contract theory as "dedicated to the
proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything."2 "4 Toward this end, contract damages had been kept low, and
sharply differentiated from tort damages. 20 5 Thus, he reasoned, the
broadening of remedies for breach of contract during the twentieth century signalled the demise of classical theory. 2"
If the premise that limited contract remedies are a key element of
classical contract theory is accepted, then the rise of the bad faith tort,
which substituted tort for contract remedies, seemed to validate Gilmore's theory that contract was dead-or at the very least, gravely
wounded. What could provide greater evidence that contract was being
reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort 7 than the imposition of tort
remedies for breach of contract?
Furthermore, the rise of the quasi-fiduciary model of contract provided temporary support for Gilmore's speculation that contract was the
victim of a cultural trend towards greater social responsibility. Quoting
at length from the legal historical work of Professor Lawrence Friedman,
Gilmore argued that classical contract theory was founded upon individual autonomy.
"Basically, then, the 'pure' law of contract is an area of
what we can call abstract relationships. 'Pure' contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and person. It does
not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought and sold
.... Contract law is abstraction-what is left in the law relat204.
205.
206.
207.

GILMORE, supra note 1, at 14.
Id at 48.
Id at 83-84.
Id at 87.
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ing to agreements when all particularities of person and subjectmatter are removed.
...The

abstraction of classical contract law is not unreal-

istic; it is a deliberate renunciation of the particular, a deliberate relinquishment of the temptation to restrict untrammeled
individual autonomy or the completely free market in the name
of social policy. The law of contract is, therefore, roughly coextensive with the free market. Liberal nineteenth-century economics fits in neatly with the law of contracts so viewed. It,
too, had the abstracting habit. In both theoretical modelsthat of the law of contracts and that of liberal economics-parties could be treated as individual economic units which, in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision." 208
Thus, Gilmore reasoned, during the nineteenth century the law assumed a narrow scope of social duty, reflected in slogans like: "No man
is his brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost."2 "9 But, during the twentieth century, he asserted, the cultural
landscape had undergone a drastic change, as indicated by the death of
contract.
For good or ill, we have changed all that. We are now all
cogs in a machine, each dependent on the other. The decline
and fall of the general theory of contract and, in most quarters,
of laissez-faire economics, may be taken as remote reflections of
the transition from nineteenth century individualism to the welfare state and beyond.21
Similarly, the early bad faith tort decisions were founded upon the
quasi-fiduciary model of contract. Under the quasi-fiduciary model, a
stronger contracting party could not disclaim responsibility for the
208. Id at 6-7 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-21

(1965)).
209. Id at 95.
210. Id at 95-96. Frankel has diagnosed a similar cultural trend, from individual freedom
towards fiduciary responsibility:
A contract society values freedom and independence highly, but it provides little

security for its members. An example of a society based primarily on contract is the
market society of the United States during the Industrial Revolution.

I submit that we are witnessing the emergence of a society predominantly based
on fiduciary relations. This type of society best reflects our contemporary social values. In our society, affluence is largely produced by interdependence, but personal
freedom is cherished. Society's members turn to an arbitrator, the government, to
obtain protection from personal coercion by those on whom they depend for specialized services. A fiduciary society attempts to maximize both the satisfaction of needs
and the protection of freedom.
Frankel, supra note 202, at 802.
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welfare of the weaker party; rather, it was required to act as its brother's
keeper. Therefore, the rise of the bad faith tort, and apparent decline in
the vitality of contract, reflected an emphasis upon social
2 11
responsibility.
C. Abandonment of the Quasi-FiduciaryModel of Contract
But, the impression that contract was suffering a decline was only a
temporary illusion. The bad faith tort was about to take a tumble, and a
key factor in its fall from grace would be the growing reluctance of the
courts to accept the quasi-fiduciary model of contract outside the insurance context.
1. The later cases
Consider, for example, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.2 12 and its
progeny. In Foley the California Supreme Court carefully distinguished
the employment relationship from the insurance relationship. The court
reasoned that, unlike an insured seeking to purchase security against potential economic loss, an employee does not seek any security other than
the profit to be gained from a commercial contract. 213 In other words,
the employee does not place special trust or confidence in an employer to
shelter him or her from harm. Moreover, unlike an insured, an employee
has an important option, even in the face of bad faith discharge: The
employee can always seek alternative employment.2 14 In other words,
the nature of the employment contract does not require the employee to
rely upon the good faith performance of the employer. Thus, as described in Foley, the employment relationship is inconsistent with the reliance theory of the fiduciary relationship.
This emphasis upon the alternatives available to the employee can
be read in another light. Given that an employee can seek alternative
employment, and is not utterly dependent upon the employer, the employment contract contains no inherent power imbalance. Thus, as conceived by the Foley court, the employment relationship is also
inconsistent with the unequal relationship theory of the fiduciary
relationship.
After Foley, the California Court of Appeal quickly moved to reject
bad faith tort claims in a variety of commercial contexts, often on the
211. However, as I demonstrate, the rise of the tort did not reflect a corresponding move
away from respect for individual freedom. See infra part III.
212. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
213. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
214. Id.
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grounds that no reliance or inequality existed. For example, in Martin v.

U-Haul Co.,21 the court held that a gas station owner who dealt in
rental equipment as a side business could not assert the bad faith tort

against his supplier when it terminated his equipment dealership contract
since the parties did not have a special relationship.2 16 In so holding the
court emphasized that the dealer had bargained with the supplier at
arm's length, and had the option of doing business with many other
equipment rental firms;21 7 in other words, there was no inequality of position between the parties at the time the relationship was formed. Fur-

thermore, the court continued, profit, not security, was the basis of the
relationship between the parties.218 The dealer was not especially vulnerable to a termination of his dealership contract because he could deal

with other rental equipment suppliers.2 19 In addition, renting equipment
was not the dealer's primary source of income.22 Thus, there was no
power imbalance inherent in the contractual relationship, nor did any
evidence exist that the dealer had relied upon the supplier for protection
or support.
Another recent decision displaying reluctance to invoke the quasifiduciary model of contract was Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business

Credit.221 There, the California Court of Appeal held that breach of a
commercial loan contract did not sound in tort.2 22 The court curtly re-

jected the possibility that the lender and borrower occupied unequal positions from the outset of the relationship: "There were no indicia of
unequal bargaining here, no adhesive agreements, no indication that one
party had any particular advantage over the other."2'2 3 Nor did the court
discern any inherent power imbalance or special reliance upon the
215. 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1988).
216. Id. at 415, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 28; see also Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J.Gallo
Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431, 1436-37 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding no special relationship between wine distributor and supplier that would support bad
faith tort claim for termination of distributorship).
217. Martin, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
218. Id. at 413-14, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
219. Id.
220. Id., 251 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
221. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 272 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
222. Id. at 1400-01, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 404; accord Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App.
3d 465, 475, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 739 (1989); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 726, 731-33, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793, 796-97 (1989).
223. Careau & Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1400, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 403; accord Mitsui Mfrs.
Bank, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (holding no unfairness or inequality in
negotiations resulting in commercial loan contract).
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lender; the borrowers "were [neither] in a particularly vulnerable position nor in need of any special protection."22 4
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the decline of the quasifiduciary model of contract came with the decision in Copesky v. Superior
Court.22 5 The California Court of Appeal expressly repudiated its earlier
decision in CommercialCotton Co. v. United CaliforniaBank,2 2 6 holding
that breach of a contract regarding a commercial checking account did
not sound in tort.227 Once again, the court found no inequality of position between the parties, reasoning that a commercial depositor and its
bank were not ordinarily in inherently unequal bargaining positions. 22 8
The court also argued that the primary purpose of the account was
profit, rather than security, 2 9 and that the depositor. faced no special
vulnerability in the event of breach. 3 By making this argument the
court rejected any notion that there was a power imbalance inherent in
the contract, or that the depositor had reposed special trust, confidence,
or reliance in the bank.2 3 ' Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
Copesky court took special pains to renounce its earlier characterization
in Commercial Cotton of the bank-depositor relationship as quasi-fiduciary.2 3 2 The bank, it reasoned, dealt at arm's length and in commercial
independence with its depositor. 233 It was not obliged to put the interests
2 34
of the depositor ahead of its own.
Post-Foley decisions in other states have been singing the same tune.
Stressing the lack of any inequality between the parties, the Texas Court
of Appeals declined to extend tort remedies to a distributor that did not
"require special protection" against its supplier.2 35 Similarly, the Idaho
Supreme Court declined to grant tort remedies to experienced commercial borrowers who bargained on equal terms with their lenders.23 6 And,
going right to the heart of the matter, the Colorado Court of Appeals and
the New Jersey Superior Court flatly refused to apply the fiduciary label
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Careau & Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1400, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1991).
163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
Copesky, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 694, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
Id. at 691, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
Id.

230. Id. at 692, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
231. Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
(Idaho

Id. at 692-93, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
Id. at 693 n.4, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348 n.4.
Id.
See Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
See Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 804 P.2d 900, 905
1991).
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to relationships between general and limited partners23 7 and employees
and employers,2 3 8 respectively.
2.

Implications of the later cases

How can we explain this decline in the quasi-fiduciary model of contract? What implications do the later bad faith decisions hold for the
future of contract?
To some extent, the decline of the quasi-fiduciary model of contract
may simply reflect the fact that few contracts fit the model. Under this
view early cases addressed relationships where reliance or inequality
made one party unusually vulnerable to the other. For example, insureds
are in a particularly vulnerable position; they cannot purchase substitute
insurance once loss occurs, and they are entirely dependent upon the
good faith performance of their insurers. Similarly, the fifty-five-year-old
former employee in Wallis v. Superior Court239 was particularly vulnerable; he had few options in the employment market and depended on his
former employer to pay his monthly support stipend.2 40 By contrast,
many of the later cases that rejected the quasi-fiduciary model involved
ordinary commercial relationships-such as equipment dealerships or
commercial loans-in which neither party was particularly vulnerable to
the other. Absent any such vulnerability, the later cases would have had
no reason to adopt tort remedies as a means of vindicating a moral obligation of the stronger party to look after the weaker party.
The foregoing argument has some force; undoubtedly, the range of
the quasi-fiduciary model of contract has natural limits. Nevertheless,
the argument does not explain why the courts placed some relationships,
such as employment and banking, first within, and then outside those
limits. The answer cannot lie solely in the nature of those relationships
for, with some justification, the early cases had identified indicia of reliance and inequality that placed employment and deposit contracts
squarely within the quasi-fiduciary model. For example, the K Mart
Corp. v. Ponsock24 1 court found reliance and inequality woven into the
employment contract at issue.2 42 Similarly, in Commercial Cotton Co. v.
237. See Friedman v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 825 P.2d 1033, 1042-43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 846 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1993).
238. See Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.),
cert denied, 584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990).
239. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
240. Id at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
241. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
242. Id. at 1371-72.
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United CaliforniaBank,24 3 the court argued that a commercial depositor
was completely dependent on the bank, relying on its honesty and expertise to protect deposited funds. 2" Yet, only a few years later, the Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp.245 court flatly denied that the employment relationship was "special," reasoning that employees do not seek security
from their employers, and can always seek alternative employment in
case of discharge.' 4 And the court in Copesky v. Superior Court24 7 expressly repudiated Commercial Cotton Co., arguing that a commercial
depositor sought profit rather than security and faced no special vulnerability in event of breach.24 8
In light of these contradictions, it is reasonable to conclude that the
courts moved from a generous, expansive interpretation of the quasi-fiduciary model to a narrow, more limited interpretation. Consequently, tort
remedies were rejected in favor of traditional, limited contract remedies.
Accepting Gilmore's own premise that limited contract remedies are a
key element of classical contract theory, the recent cases represent a reaffirmation of that theory. Thus, contract is not dead, but rather very
much alive.
Furthermore, by developing the quasi-fiduciary model and awarding
tort remedies for bad faith breach of contract, the early decisions imposed a moral obligation upon the stronger contracting party to behave
altruistically, serving the weaker party through contract performance.
But recent decisions have limited the quasi-fiduciary model and rejected
tort remedies, suggesting that altruism has been outweighed by other policy considerations that support traditional, limited contract remedies. 249
III.

INDMDUAL AUTONOMY

Thus far, I have identified one policy implication of the early bad
faith tort decisions: an emphasis upon altruism, defined as the moral
obligation of the stronger contracting party to act as the weaker party's
keeper through contract performance. I analyzed altruism first because
it was most clearly expressed in the language and reasoning of the relevant cases. Like a blazing torch in the night, this policy implication was
relatively simple to detect and describe. Now, it is time to turn to an243. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See id at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
Id at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1991).
Id at 693-94, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
See infra part IV.
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other policy implication of the early cases. Like a smoke signal scattered
across a darkening sky, this implication is more difficult to see, but it
carries an important message that must not be overlooked.
A. Individual Autonomy as the MoralBasis of Promise
The idea that there is a moral obligation to keep promises is not
new. As Dean Roscoe Pound wrote:
From antiquity the moral obligation to keep a promise had
been a cardinal tenet of ethical philosophers, publicists, and
philosophical jurists. Thus, Plato quotes a saying of Simonides
that justice is speaking the truth and the Platonists later spoke
of justice as truthfulness. Demosthenes argued that the laws
should be obeyed because men, as citizens, had agreed to do so.
Cicero, in a treatise on duties had put stress on thepriscafides,
good faith keeping of promises, by the old Romans. Faithful
keeping of a promise was a tenet of Christian morals pronounced by a council of the early church incorporated in the
corpus of the canon law. The seventeenth-century jurists of the
law-of-nature school repeated it as a proposition of natural
law.... The Declaration of Independence laid down that government derived its just powers from the consent of the governed who contracted to be bound.250
Throughout the centuries scholars and philosophers have propounded a wide range of theories describing the origin of the moral obligation to keep promises. 51 Such hypotheses range from the reliance
theory, which urges that promises must be kept because promisees rely
upon them, 25 2 to the layperson's intuition that promises are sacred per se,
making the breaking of promises inherently despicable and intolerable in
a properly organized society. 5 3 Any attempt to list and categorize all
these theories would be well beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, in order to continue my analysis, I will choose and work with one
theory of the moral obligation to keep promises.
250. Roscoe Pound, Promise or Bargain?,33 TUL. L. REv. 455 (1959).
251. See generally id. at 458-63 (describing several theories of moral obligation to keep
promises).
252. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RiSE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184-89 (1979).
253. See Pound, supra note 250, at 459; see also Mark Pennington, Punitive Damagesfor
Breach of Contract A Core Samplefrom the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV.
31, 45 (1989) (explaining recent tendency to award punitive damages for breach of contract as
"reflecting a belief of the general public[ ] that breaking a promise is a serious wrong which
ought to be punished").
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In his book ContractasPromise, Professor Charles Fried argues that
the purpose of promise is the maximization of individual autonomy.2" 4
The convention of promising allows individuals to give their free will the
greatest possible range.25 By committing themselves to particular
courses of action, individuals can participate in the projects of others
who must count on their future conduct.2 6 Thus, although promising
may seem to restrict autonomy, in fact the restrictions involved in promising are undertaken in order to increase future options, and are consis25 7
tent with the principle of autonomy.
Once the convention of promising has been invoked, Fried reasons,
it is wrong to break the promise. Fried states:
[T]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in
trust.... An individual is morally bound to keep his promises
because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a
confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only
like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is in25 8
tended to invoke the bonds of trust.
Fried's theory as to why promises must be kept is squarely based on
the individual and his or her right to freedom. The purpose of promise is
to maximize freedom, and the moral obligation to keep promises is
founded upon respect for the exercise of individual freedom. "[R]espect
for others as free and rational requires taking seriously their capacity to
determine their own values."2 9 Therefore, while Fried characterizes the
promise breaker as someone who abuses trust, he perceives the obligation
to keep promises as essentially based on the conduct of the promisor,
rather than on the expectations or needs of the promisee. 2 °
There are two reasons why Fried's theory of promise recommends
itself as a promising vehicle for my analysis. First, based upon notions of
individual freedom and responsibility, the theory is consistent with a persistent leitmotif in American society. Individual freedom remains a pri254.

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
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256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16 (endnotes omitted).
Id. at 20.
See id at 10-11.
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mary value within our culture. Witness the continued vitality of the
"bad samaritan" rule. In the name of individual liberty, 26 1 it states that a
person has no duty to offer assistance to another in dire need.262 Additionally, consider the undiminished vigor of the First Amendment, which
continues to guarantee the right to say what one wants free ofgovernmental restriction, despite attempts to ban flag burning 263 or to restrict
264
certain types of speech on college campuses.
Second, Fried's theory, which emphasizes individual autonomy,
contrasts sharply with the quasi-fiduciary model of contract, which emphasizes the moral obligation of the strong to look after the weak. Thus,
Fried's theory permits us to critique Gilmore's theory from a fresh, new
perspective.
B. RelationshipsInvolving Incentive to Breach
1. The early cases
Armed with Fried's theory of promise, I am prepared to analyze
and explain the early success of the bad faith tort, beginning with the
insurance context.
Consider the nature of the insurance relationship. The insured performs its promise by first paying the premium to the insurer. Should a
specified illness, catastrophe, or other loss occur, the insurer pays the
amount of the policy to the insured. The problem is that the insurer has
little incentive to perform once the loss has occurred. On the one hand,
performance would help to keep the insured satisfied; but, the insured's
satisfaction is not particularly important. The premium has already been
paid and the goodwill of one customer has little value to a large insurance company. On the other hand, performance would hurt the insurer
financially: Payment under the policy would shift funds from the insurer to the insured or to a third-party claimant. Thus, the very nature
of the insurance relationship creates a strong economic incentive for the
insurer to break its promise to the insured. Such incentive could induce
widespread promise breaking within the insurance context.
Significantly, the courts have identified the insurer's overwhelming
incentive to breach as a reason to adopt tort remedies within the insur261. See, ag., Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: .4 Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV.
51, 51 (1972); Robert L. Hale, PrimaFacie Torts, Combination,and Non-Feasance,46 COLUM.

L. REv. 196, 214 (1946).
262. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 375.

263. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
264. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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ance context. As one court has noted, performance of the contract involves a wealth transfer from insurer to insured or to a third-party
claimant;2 6 thus, the insurer has a strong incentive to break its promise
and reject the insured's claim. In the face of this incentive, contract remedies offer "no motivation whatsoever for the insurer not to breach."2'6 6
The classic remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages-that
is, an award of money that places the promisee in the same position it
would have enjoyed if the promisor had performed its promise.2 67 At
worst an award of expectation damages would require the insurer to pay
the amount owed under the policy. At best the insurer might force the
insured into a pretrial settlement for less than the policy amount.2 6
Thus, the courts have concluded that tort remedies must be adopted in
order to provide a meaningful deterrent against bad faith breach.
Examining the early success of the bad faith tort in other contexts, I
note cases involving the same problem: a contractual relationship giving
one party a strong economic incentive to breach. For example, the employer in K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock2 69 fired a tenured employee just six
months before his retirement benefits would have vested in order to
evade payment of those benefits. 270 Like an insured, this employee had
already performed most of his side of the bargain, having worked for
nearly the entire period required for vesting of benefits.2 7 1 But like an
insurer, this employer had no real incentive to perform its side of the
bargain by continuing the employment until retirement benefits had
vested. The economic value of the employee's remaining services must
have appeared small when compared to the financial loss that payment of
retirement benefits would entail. Thus, the nature of this particular employment relationship created a strong economic incentive for the employer to discharge the employee in bad faith. Contract remedies could
not have neutralized this incentive. Even if the employee won his case,
the employer would only have paid the same retirement benefits in the
form of expectation damages.
265. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 234 (1988).
266. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1984).
267. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.8, at 871.
268. See, eg., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575-76 (Ariz. 1986); Wallis, 160 Cal.
App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128; Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
269. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
270. Id at 1365.
271. Id at 1366.
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The K Mart court recognized that the employer had an incentive to
breach, and that contract remedies were powerless to counteract that incentive. "If all a large corporate employer had to do was to pay contract
damages," the court declared, "it would allow and even encourage dismissals of employees on the eve of retirement with virtual impunity."2 2
Since contract damages did not provide an adequate deterrent, the court
held that the employee could seek tort remedies for the bad faith
27 3
breach.
Wallis v. Superior Court274 presented a similar problem. Before
leaving his job, the employee extracted from his employer a promise to
make monthly support payments until he could begin drawing pension
benefits.
Three years after the employee left the company, the employer reneged on the obligation to make support payments.2 76 At this
point the former employee had already performed his part of the bargain
by not competing after leaving the job. The employer, however, had littie incentive to perform by continuing to make the monthly support payments.27 7 Whatever value there might have been in maintaining the
goodwill of a former employee, the high cost of the support payments
outweighed it. Accordingly, this particular contractual relationship involved a strong economic incentive for the employer to terminate the
support payments in bad faith. And, as the California Court of Appeal
expressly recognized, contract remedies could not have eliminated this
incentive; at its worst the employer would have been forced to pay the
same support in the form of expectation damages.27 8 "If [the employee]
obtained a judgment against [the employer] for mere breach of contract,
[the employer] would only have to pay what it owed anyway.) 279 On
this basis the court held that bad faith breach of the contract sounded in
28 0
tort.
Consistent with the foregoing cases, the Arizona Supreme Court has
denied tort remedies where a contractual relationship did not involve any
special incentive to breach. In Oldenburgerv. Del E. Webb Development
Co. ,281 consumer buyers entered into a contract with a development
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id at 1372 (emphasis added).
d at 1372-73.
160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
Id at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
Id
Id at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
Id
Id at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Id at 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
765 P.2d 531 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
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company for the purchase of a residence under construction.2 82 When
the buyers insisted that they be allowed to install a nonstandard bathtub,
the development company cancelled the sale. 2 3 The buyers sued, alleging a claim for tortious breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing.2 84 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
development company, and the buyers appealed.28 5
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against the
buyers on the bad faith tort claim.28 6 Seeking to distinguish cases that
had recognized the bad faith tort within the insurance context, the court
noted that it was frequently in the economic interest of an insurance
company to breach its contract.28 7 Thus, tort remedies had been adopted
in order to provide a substantial deterrent against breach of the insurance
contract. 28 By contrast, the court continued, the consumers in the present case had not explained why tort remedies were necessary to deter
home sellers from breaching their contracts. 28 9 No factors unique to the
home construction industry had been identified that were not applicable
to all consumer sales.290
In sum, early decisions demonstrated a concern that certain contracting parties-insurers in particular-had too much incentive to break
their promises. Tort remedies countered these incentives and thus deterred promise breaking.
2.

Implications of the early cases

What are the policy implications of these early bad faith tort decisions, with their emphasis upon the incentive that certain parties have to
break their promises? According to Fried, the purpose of promise is to
increase individual autonomy, and the moral obligation to keep promises
is founded upon respect for the exercise of individual autonomy.2 9 '
Viewed in light of his theory, the early bad faith tort decisions reflect
concern for the institution of promise and its underlying value of individual autonomy.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id at 532.
Id.
Id at 533.
Id. at 531.
Id at 536.
Id at 535 (discussing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 596 (Axiz. Ct. App. 1985)).
Id (discussing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)).
Id.
Id
FRIED, supra note 254, at 16.
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To explain this conclusion, consider what happens when a promisor
breaches a contract in bad faith. As discussed above, the policy underlying traditional contract remedies is compensation, rather than compulsion.192 The promisor need not perform its promise, but if it does not, it
must make the promisee whole. Thus, the classic remedy for breach of
contract is expectation damages, which seek to place the promisee in the
same position as if the promisor had performed its promise.29 3
In a world where contract remedies provided perfect compensation
for the promisee's loss upon breach, bad faith breach of contract might
not pose a threat to the institution of promise. The possibility of breach
would not cause a potential promisee to shy away from a profitable deal,
since it would be satisfied with expectation damages as a true substitute
for performance. Unfortunately, we do not live in such a world. Due to
the limited nature of contract remedies, a promisee is often undercompensated: It cannot recover damages for economic loss that the promisor
did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of breach when the
contract was made. 9 4 Additionally, the promisee cannot collect damages for emotional distress unless the breach caused bodily harm or was
of a kind particularly likely to result in serious emotional disturbance. 295
Perhaps most importantly, the promisee cannot recoup attorney's fees
and court costs, even if it wins the case, unless the contract in issue provides otherwise.2 9 6 Since expectation damages are not a true substitute
for performance, the promisee must be able to depend upon the promisor
to perform its promise. If it cannot, the promisee is less likely to enter
into a contract with the promisor, and a profitable transaction may be
lost.
Therefore, every bad faith breach of contract results in some incremental loss of confidence in the institution of contractual promise. Undoubtedly, the institution is strong enough to survive the occasional
assault upon its integrity; however, pervasive bad faith breach would
pose a more serious threat to the willingness of promisees to repose their
faith in promisors. And, when prospective promisees become reluctant
to enter upon courses of action that require a reliable commitment, individual autonomy is decreased for promisees and promisors alike.
Against this background the connection between the early bad faith
decisions and individual autonomy is more clearly visible. Taking the
292. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
293. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.8, at 871.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979).
295. IM § 353.
296. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 42, § 1037, at 225; Putz & Klippen, supra note 84, at 424.
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insurance cases as an example, the very nature of the performance required under an insurance contract-the transfer of wealth from insurer
to insured-guarantees that, in every case, the insurer has a strong incentive to breach its contract. Thus, there is a very real threat of epidemic
breach within the insurance context. Unlike occasional breach of contract, such widespread breach could seriously undermine confidence in
the promises of insurers. Consequently, the ability of individuals to
freely order their affairs through the purchase of insurance contracts
would be reduced. The autonomy of prospective insurers would also suffer, since they would have fewer opportunities to make profits by entering into insurance contracts. By countering the insurers' incentive to
breach with extensive tort remedies, including punitive damages, the bad
faith tort made the promises of insurers more reliable than they would
otherwise have been, thereby encouraging the making of insurance contracts and increasing the autonomy of prospective insureds and insurers.
Going beyond the insurance context, cases such as K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock2 97 and Wallis v. Superior Court 9 8 demonstrated that other contractual relationships could also create a strong incentive to breach.
Generalizing from those cases, where one contracting party has already
performed, and the benefits to be derived from maintaining its goodwill
are minimal, the other party has an unusually strong incentive to maximize wealth by withholding its own performance. By neutralizing this
incentive, tort remedies strengthen the institution of promise within such
relationships and help to preserve the widest range of options for prospective promisors and promisees. Thus, these cases, too, reflected a concern for individual autonomy.
To some, this analysis of the early bad faith tort cases may seem
counterintuitive. Some might characterize promise breaking not as a
threat to individual freedom, but rather as the exercise of individual freedom: "[Along with] the celebrated freedom to make contracts, [comes] a
considerable freedom to break them as well." 2 99 In that case, imposition
of tort remedies for breach of contract would seem to restrict, rather than
promote, individual autonomy. However, as Fried notes, "the mystery
that surrounds increasing autonomy by providing means for restricting
it" is a "pseudomystery." 3° If promises are not binding, they are not
meaningful, and the options available to the individual are decreased. 0 1
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
Farnsworth, supra note 20, at 1147.,
FRIED, supra note 254, at 14.
See id.
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Thus, imposing tort remedies for breach of promise is consistent with
respect for individual autonomy.
At this point Gilmore's theory may be critiqued from an interesting,
new perspective. On the one hand, if we accept the premise that limited
remedies are the heart and soul of classical contract theory, we must
concede that the rise of the bad faith tort seemed-for a time-to validate Gilmore's thesis that contract was dead. On the other hand, the
above analysis contradicts his theory as to why contract was dead. As I
have shown, Gilmore believed that the death of contract reflected society's move away from nineteenth-century individualism, with its emphasis upon autonomy and freedom of decision .3 °2 But, to the extent the bad
faith tort suggested that contract was dead, that "death" reflected a move
toward individual freedom. By counteracting incentives that threatened
to induce breach of contract in some contexts, tort remedies reinforced
the ability of the individual to order his or her affairs through the institution of contractual promise. Thus, the rise of the bad faith tort confirmed individual freedom as an important cultural value.
C. RelationshipsNot Involving Incentive to Breach
Whereas the early bad faith tort decisions stressed the strong economic incentive that insurers and certain other persons had to break
their promises, later cases recognized that such incentive was not present
in most contractual relationships. This realization hastened the death of
the bad faith tort.
1. The later cases
The Foley v. InteractiveData Corp.303 case is representative. To support its holding that breach of an employment contract did not sound in
tort, the California Supreme Court rushed to distinguish the employment
relationship from that between insured and insurer. The insurer and insured are financially at odds, the court reasoned, since payment simply
shifts money from the insurer to insured.3°" By contrast, the interests of
the employer and employee are aligned, since it is to the employer's own
economic benefit to retain good employees. 0 Accordingly, the need to
place disincentives on an employer's conduct in addition to those already
imposed by law did not rise to the level created by the conflicting inter302. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95.
303. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
304. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
305. Id.
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ests of insurer and insured.3 0 6 Thus, the California Supreme Court conof
cluded that tort remedies were not necessary to combat a 30threat
7
context.
employment
the
within
breaking
widespread promise
Similarly, the need to combat promise breaking within the investment context was minimized in Wholesale Electric Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros.308 There, an investor filed a complaint for breach of fiduciary
duty against a brokerage house that had invested and lost its funds.3 °9
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the investor on its claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.310 The investor then filed a second complaint
for tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, alleging
that the brokerage house had refused to enter into meaningful discussions prior to the first suit, had intentionally made untrue statements,
had wrongfully denied the existence of any agreement, had refused to
make good faith settlement offers, and had destroyed evidence relevant to
its breach of fiduciary duty claim. 311 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid cause of action.31 2
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the investor
had not "alleg[ed] facts sufficient to show the special relationship necessary for tort damages for breach of the implied covenant. ' 313 This holding was based in part on the court's reasoning that the financial interests
of the investor and brokerage house were not at odds; rather, it was in
the brokerage house's financial interest to make money on its clients' accounts.314 In other words, the relationship between the investor and brokerage house did not involve an inherent risk of promise breaking.
The Arizona Supreme Court sounded a similar note in Burkons v.
Ticor Title Insurance Co. 31 In that case, a development company contracted to purchase a parcel of Phoenix real estate from an unsophisticated seller for a small down payment, securing the balance of the purchase
price with a note secured by a deed of trust.31 6 The seller agreed to
subordinate his purchase money deed of trust to a loan that he believed
would be used to finance construction on the property.317 Instead, the
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
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Id., 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
221 Cal. App. 3d 617, 270 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1990).
Id. at 620, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
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Ideat 621, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
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813 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1991).
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buyer used part of the loan to pay the down payment to the seller and
pocketed the remainder. 3 Unfortunately, the escrow agent involved in
the transaction facilitated the fraud by disbursing the loan to the buyer
without restriction.3 9 The buyer did not improve the property and defaulted on the note, leaving the seller holding a subordinate deed of trust
on property, which was not worth enough to cover both the "construction" loan and the balance of the purchase price.32 0 The seller sued his
escrow agent, 321 alleging that the agent had breached the escrow contract
by subordinating his deed of trust to a loan that was not used for construction, contrary to the escrow instructions. 322 The seller also asserted
a bad faith tort claim, complaining that the escrow agent had refused to
restore his deed of trust to first position by acquiring and forgiving the
other loan.3 23 In effect, this amounted to a claim that the escrow agent
was liable in tort because of failure to pay the seller his contractual damages on demand.3 24 The trial court dismissed the bad faith count for
failure to state a claim and awarded summary judgment to the escrow
agent on the remaining counts. 32 5 After the court of appeals reversed on
all counts, the escrow agent appealed.3 26
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
summary judgment was inappropriate on the breach of contract claim.
The court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the parties had manifested intent that the subordination agreement be made conditional upon use of the loan proceeds for construction.327 However, the supreme court agreed with the trial court that the
seller had failed to state a valid bad faith tort claim. 328 The court opined
that a party who breached a contract had no duty to accede to the other
party's demand for payment of contract damages.32 9 Moreover, tort
damages were most often allowed in situations where the rule restricting
recovery to contract damages would promote breach of the contract
318. Id.
319. Id. at 712-13.
320. See id. at 713 & n.5 (discussing fact that property was "over-encumbered").
321. The record does not disclose whether the seller collected anything on the buyer's note
or took any action to foreclose his purchase money deed of trust. Id. at 713.
322. Id. at 713-14.
323. Id. at 720.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 714.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 716.
328. Id. at 721.
329. Id. at 720.
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rather than performance. 3 30 Here, the seller had not alleged that the
contract measure of damages was insufficient to deter other escrow
agents from breaching their duties.33 1 In other words, the court rejected
tort remedies in part because such remedies were unnecessary to protect
the institution of promise; escrow agents had no special incentive to
breach their agreements.
In sum, arguments that promisors had strong incentives to break
their promises fell upon stony ground in later cases. The courts did not
recognize any new contexts or relationships in which the incentive to
breach justified imposition of tort remedies as a deterrent. Consequently,
further extension of the bad faith tort beyond the insurance context was
curtailed.
2.

Implications of the later cases

Once again, a conundrum is apparent: What do these later bad faith
tort cases represent, with their rejection of the bad faith tort?
One possible conclusion is that the early and later cases involved
fundamentally different contractual relationships. Under this view early
cases addressed unusual relationships that created particularly strong incentives to breach. For example, an insurer has a strong economic incentive to breach, creating a risk of epidemic promise breaking within an
entire category of contract. Similarly, the early cases of K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock33 2 and Walis v. Superior Court333 involved one-sided relationships that gave one party a strong incentive to breach. By contrast, the
later cases addressed ordinary commercial relationships, which did not
create such a powerful incentive to breach rather than perform. Absent
any risk of widespread promise breaking, the later cases would have had
no reason to adopt tort remedies in order to protect the institution of
promise and its underlying value of individual autonomy.
At the same time, the later cases, which rejected tort remedies for
breach of contract, might reflect decreased concern regarding promise
breaking. In other words, because tort remedies would have strongly
encouraged contract parties to keep their promises, refusal to award tort
remedies could suggest relative indifference as to whether those promises
were kept. Moreover, the moral obligation to keep promises is founded
upon respect for individual autonomy. Thus, any such indifference to330.
331.
332.
333.
text.
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Id at 721.
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wards promise breaking could indicate that individual autonomy, though
important, has been outweighed by policy considerations supporting the
traditional, limited remedies for breach of contract.3 34
In either event, my analysis demonstrates that contract is alive and
well. By embracing traditional, limited remedies for breach of contract,
the later cases reaffirmed the very core of classical contract theory. Interestingly, however, this return to traditional remedies does not reflect a
return to individualism, as Gilmore might have surmised. 3 5 Rather, the
return to traditional remedies reflects a return to some other policy considerations that have yet to be identified.
IV.

EFFICIENT BREACH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

So far, my analysis has emphasized the policy implications of the
rise of the bad faith tort. The next and final task is to identify the policy
implications of the death of the tort and the return of traditional, limited
contract remedies.
A.

The Theory of Efficient Breach

As noted above, the policy underlying traditional contract remedies
is compensation, rather than compulsion. Through expectation damages
the law seeks to place the promisee in the same position it would have
enjoyed if the promisor had performed the promise.3 3 6 Why should the
common law choose expectation damages as the classic, but limited, remedy for breach of contract? One popular explanation is based upon the
notion of efficient breach.33 7 Economists use several different definitions
of efficiency, but for my limited purposes here, efficiency can be defined
as "pareto superiority." A voluntary transaction is pareto superior when
it makes "at least one person in the world better off and no one worse
8
33

off."

A hypothetical example illustrates the concept of efficient breach.
Suppose A promises to sell ten widgets to B at a price of $300 per widget,
for a total of $3000. Later, C offers to purchase the same ten widgets at a
price of $400 per widget, for a total of $4000. A knows that B can
purchase substitute widgets from another seller at a price of $325 per
widget, for a total of $3250. Accordingly, A deliberately breaches the
334. See infra part IV.
335. See GILMORE, supra note 1,at 95-96.
336. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.8, at 871-78.
337. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
(arguing that economics is powerful tool for analyzing legal questions).
338. Id at 12.
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contract with B and sells the widgets to C. Then, out of the additional
$1000 profit earned on the deal with C,A pays $250 in expectation damages to B.
This breach is efficient because it is pareto superior. A, who has
earned a net additional profit of $750, is better off, C, who has the widgets it wanted, is better off, and B, who has been paid $250 in expectation
damages, is no worse off since those damages place B in the same position it would have been in had A performed the original promise.33 9
Reasoning that society benefits when its resources are allocated efficiently, some scholars have argued that efficient breach of contract is
desirable and should be encouraged. 3 1 In their view expectation damages are the ideal remedy for breach of contract, since they permit efficient breach to take place.34 1 Thus, if a promisor must pay only
expectation damages, it will breach whenever it can place the promisee in
the same position it would have enjoyed upon performance and still
make a profit-that is, whenever breach is efficient. 34 2 By contrast, these
scholars believe that punitive damages are an undesirable remedy for
breach of contract because they would have the effect of discouraging
efficient breach.34 3 To explain why, reconsider the widget hypothetical.
Breach of the original contract with B and sale of the widgets to C is
efficient because A and C are better off, and B is no worse off once it
recovers expectation damages. But A would hesitate to commit this efficient breach if it knew that B could recover not only $250 in expectation
damages, but also some potentially enormous punitive damage award.
However elegant in theory, the efficient breach theory cannot justify
every breach of contract in practice. Too often, expectation damages
leave the promisee undercompensated. As noted above, the promisee can
recover damages for economic loss only if its loss was foreseeable when
the contract was made. 344 The promisee cannot collect damages for
emotional distress 345 or recoup attorney's fees and court costs, even if it
wins the case.3 5 Thus, promisees who cannot afford to pay their own
attorney's fees and court costs may not sue at all. To the extent promis339. See id. at 107.
340. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
111 (1981).
341. See, eg., POSNER, supra note 337, at 107-10; Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 284 (1970).
342. See Birmingham, supra note 341, at 284; Linzer, supra note 340, at 114-15.
343. See POSNER, supra note 337, at 116; Birmingham, supra note 341, at 284.
344. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979).
345. See id. § 353.
346. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 42, § 1037; Putz & Klippen, supra note 84, at 424.
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ees sue and are undercompensated-or fail to sue altogether-promisors
are free to commit inefficient breaches that cannot be justified in terms of
efficient allocation of resources.' 7
B. Recognizing the Problem of Inefficient Breach
1. The early cases
Against this background the bad faith tort can be viewed in a different light. The insurance cases that gave birth to the tort are a logical
starting point for my analysis. Those cases involved insurers who, after
taking premiums from their insureds, refused in bad faith to perform
their obligations under their insurance contracts.3 48 Were these breaches
of contract efficient? Not at all. As Professor Thomas Diamond has
explained:
The [insurance] company does not breach because it has discovered an alternative allocation of resources, the gains of
which exceed the promisee's expected losses. When the contractual obligation breached is one to pay money, damages for
the breach must at least equal the money that has not been
paid. The insurance company's breach results in a gain to the
company only if it is not required to pay the damages caused by
breach. Its gains are exclusively at the promisee's expense.34 9
Thus, according to Diamond, "perhaps the most cogent explanation
of why the tort of bad faith breach ever developed is that tort sanctions
were essential to prevent such [inefficient] breaches by insurance
350
companies.9
Unlike Diamond, the courts have not expressly cited inefficient
breach as the reason for granting tort remedies within the insurance context. Nevertheless, the reasons courts have given for awarding tort remedies suggest that inefficient breach is an underlying concern. For
example, the courts have asserted that ordinary contract remedies are
inadequate to protect the rights of the insured because they offer no motivation whatsoever for the insurer not to breach:
347. See Birmingham,supra note 341, at 285; Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?,
64 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 440-42 (1981); Putz & Klippen, supra note 84, at 431-32.
348. See Pennington, supra note 253, at 51; supra note 21 and accompanying text.
349. Diamond, supra note 347, at 446 (footnote omitted); see also Pennington, supra note
253, at 53-54 (arguing courts award punitive damages against insurers in effort to deter inefficient breach).
350. Diamond, supra note 347, at 446.
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If the only damages an insurer will have to pay upon a judgment of breach are the amounts that it would have owed under
the policy plus interest, it has every interest in retaining the
money, earning the higher rates of interest on the outside market, and hoping eventually to force the insured into a settlement
for less than the policy amount.3"'
This passage describes an inefficient breach since the insurer is seeking to achieve gains at the expense of the insured. Thus, the passage
could be read as saying that contract remedies are inadequate because
they offer no motivation whatsoever for the insurer not to commit an
inefficient breach.
The courts have also awarded tort remedies on the rationale that
contract damages do not make the insured whole, reasoning that
"[m]oney damages paid pursuant to a judgment years after the insurer
has initially reneged on payment do not remedy the harm suffered by the
insured, namely the immediate inability to support oneself and its attendant horrors. ' ' 3 2 As noted above, to the extent contract damages undercompensate the promisee, the promisor is free to commit inefficient
breach.3" 3 Thus, while this reasoning emphasizes the vulnerability of the
insured, it also implicitly recognizes that limited contract remedies allow
insurers to commit inefficient breach.
Taking the above reasoning a step further, Diamond has argued that
the bad faith tort should not be limited to the insurance context.35 4 In
his view, any willful breach induced by anticipated gains that would not
exceed the promisee's losses is unjust, promotes no social goals, and damages the fabric of societal integrity and commercial stability. 35 5 Consequently, willful breach should be regarded as tortious whenever the
breaching party could not, at the time of breach, reasonably have expected the breach to be economically efficient.35 6
351. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1984);
accord Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575-76 (Ariz. 1986); Arnold v. National County

Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987), modified, Murray v. San Jacinto Agency,
Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).

352. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
353. See supra part IV.A.
354. Diamond, supra note 347, at 436.
355. Id. at 438.

356. Id.at 444, 448; cf John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive andNonpecuniaryDamagesin Actions
Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 1565, 1659-60 (1986) (arguing that punitive damages should be awarded against inten-

tionally breaching party in order to provide full compensation to victim of breach, regardless
of whether breach is efficient).
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Diamond penned this theory in 1981, when the bad faith tort was
just beginning to move beyond the insurance context. The Montana
Supreme Court relied upon Diamond's theory in Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance.35 7 Quoting Diamond, the Montana Supreme Court conceded that certain intentional breaches should be encouraged:
"'Permitting parties to breach their contracts promotes an efficient economy, at least when the gains from the breach exceed the expected pecuniary injuries of the promisee.' ,"3s However, the court continued, each
party had a justifiable expectation that the other would act reasonably,
whether performing or breaching.3 5 9 Whenever one party frustrated this
justifiable expectation by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, the other could assert a bad faith tort claim.3 ° Thus, Nicholson
implied that tort remedies were appropriate whenever a party acted unreasonably by committing an inefficient breach.3 6 1
Wallis v. Superior Court,362 another case extending the bad faith tort
beyond the insurance context, also shows a heightened sensitivity to the
problem of inefficient breach. Recall that Wallis involved a contract
made just before termination of employment; the employer promised to
make monthly support payments until the employee reached retirement
age, while the employee promised to refrain from competing with the
employer's business.3 63 When the employer's business took a turn for the
worse, it stopped making payments and the employee sued for tortious
breach of contract. a 4
Holding that the employee had stated a valid cause of action, the
California Court of Appeal reasoned that ordinary contract damages did
not discourage an employer from breaching; even if the employee won
his case, the employer would only have to pay what it owed anyway.365
In other words, contract damages offered no incentive for the employer
not to commit an inefficient breach, seeking only to enrich itself at the
357. 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
358. Id at 1348 (quoting Diamond, supra note 347, at 453).
359. Id
360. Id
361. The Montana Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation of Nicholson in Dunfee v.
Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148 (Mont. 1986). There, the court explained that Nicholson
distinguished legitimate, efficient breaches actionable in contract from unreasonable breaches
actionable in tort. Id. at 1153. The Dunfee court went on to uphold a jury verdict for tortious
breach of the duty of good faith against a franchisor that had unreasonably refused to permit
its franchisee to move an ice cream store to a more desirable location. Id.
362. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
363. Id at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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employee's expense by terminating the promised payments. Moreover,
the employee's immediate precarious financial position due to termination of payments could not be remedied by a lump-sum payment received
several years later.36 6 The employer was free to commit an inefficient
breach because limited contract remedies would leave the employee undercompensated. Therefore, tort remedies were necessary in order to deter inefficient breach.
Finally, the award of tort remedies in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. StandardOil Co. 367 can be explained in terms of inefficient breach.
Standard had entered into a contract to provide a ship supply dealer
named Seaman's with its fuel requirements.36 8 Shortly thereafter, an oil
shortage caused a sharp increase in fuel prices, and the federal government issued regulations requiring suppliers to continue providing fuel to
existing customers.36 9 In an effort to escape its obligations,
Standard
370
Seaman's.
with
contract
its
acknowledge
to
flatly refused
The California Supreme Court held that a party could incur tort
remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it sought to shield
itself from liability for breach of contract by denying, in bad faith and
without probable cause, that the contract existed.3 In support the court
noted that a contracting party would be subject to tort liability-including punitive damages-if it coerced the other party to pay more than was
due under the contract through the threat of a spurious lawsuit. 7 2
"There is little difference... between a contracting party obtaining excess payment in such manner," the court continued, "and a contracting
party seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by
adopting a 'stonewall' position.., without probable cause and with no
belief in the existence of a defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere
breach of contract. It offends accepted notions of business ethics. ' 373 In
such a situation, the court concluded, tort remedies were not likely to
upset the parties' reasonable expectations. 7 4
This passage evokes, without ever directly mentioning, the problem
of inefficient breach. The court painted a vivid picture of a contracting
party who, by breaching the contract and then evading all liability for
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id
36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
Id at 760, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
Id. at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
Id., 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
Id at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
Id
Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
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expectation damages in bad faith, seeks to gain solely at the expense of
the other party. Confronted with this conduct, which smacks of inefficient breach, the court responded by imposing tort remedies as a deterrent. The court's final comment is particularly revealing. The
reasonable expectations of a promisor include the right to substitute efficient breach for performance upon payment of expectation damages.37 5
Thus, the imposition of tort remedies for breach of contract would conflict with the reasonable expectations of the promisor unless it was substituting inefficient breach for performance.
Summarizing the analysis so far, the early bad faith tort cases
showed increased sensitivity to the problem of inefficient breach. The
courts began by granting tort remedies in the insurance context, relying
on factors indicating that contract remedies were inadequate to deter
inefficient breach. In extending the tort remedies to other contexts, subsequent cases also stressed the need to deter inefficient breach.
2.

Implications of the early cases

What inferences can be drawn from these early bad faith tort decisions? Did they indicate disenchantment with the efficient breach theory
as such? Not really. Rather, the early cases simply acknowledged that
efficient allocation of resources, while a worthy objective, could not justify breaches of contract that were inefficient. Freed from the shadow of
efficient breach theory, policies that supported contract performance,
such as altruism and individual freedom, took on a new luster and prominence. Tort remedies were adopted to deter inefficient breaches of contract, which threatened both altruism and individual freedom, without
providing any compensating benefit in the form of efficient allocation of
resources.
Presumably, Gilmore would have been delighted by this turn of
events, for it supported his thesis. Gilmore believed that narrow contract
remedies were a key element of classical contract theory.3 76 In his view
the broadening of remedies for breach of contract during the twentieth
century signaled the demise of classical theory.3 77 For a time the early
bad faith tort cases seemed to prove Gilmore's point. Their substitution
of broad tort remedies for classical contract remedies hinted that contract was in decline. Moreover, by recognizing that classical contract
375. See Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985); see also
HOLMES, supra note 19, at 301 (stating that promisor is free to breach contract upon payment
of damages).
376. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 14.
377. Id. at 83-84.
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remedies permitted not only efficient, but also inefficient breach, the early
cases cast doubt upon the primary policy rationale for keeping such remedies limited.
C. Economic Values Support Limited ContractRemedies
1. The later cases
The impression that contract was teetering on the edge of destruction was short-lived, however. By the late 1980s most courts refused to
award tort remedies for breach of contract, even though they continued
to implicitly acknowledge the problem of inefficient breach.
Once again, the Foley v. InteractiveData Corp.378 case is instructive.
Having determined that there was no special relationship between employer and employee comparable to that between insurer and insured, 7 9
the Foley court went on to consider other arguments advanced in favor of
extending the bad faith tort to the employment context. 380 The court
noted that "[t]he most frequently cited reason for the move to extend tort
remedies.., is the perception that traditional contract remedies are inadequate to compensate for certain breaches.1 3 1 1 As discussed, when contract remedies are inadequate to make promisees whole, promisors are
free to commit breaches that cannot be justified in terms of efficient allocation of resources.38 2 Thus, the Foley court implicitly recognized the
risk of inefficient breach.
However, the Foley court questioned whether the problem of inadequate compensation could or should be resolved by departing from established principles of contract law. 3 Reasoning that the answer could
alter the nature of employment, the cost of products and services, and the
availability of jobs, the court concluded that the decision was best left to
the legislature. 3 4 Thus, unlike earlier courts, the Foley court did not
accept inadequate contract remedies, with their undercurrent of inefficient breach, as a license to grant tort remedies.
The Copesky v. Superior Court38 5 decision, which rejected tort reme-

dies for breach of a commercial deposit contract, 3 6 employed similar
reasoning. Working with the third Wallis factor, the California Court of
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
Id. at 690-93, 765 P.2d at 394-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-35.
I. at 693-94, 765 P.2d at 396-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
Id at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
See supra notes 336-47 and accompanying text.
Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
Id.
229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1991).
Id. at 694, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
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Appeal conceded that the depositor's recovery against the bank for cashing a forged check might be inadequate since he could not recover attorney's fees and other court costs. 38 7 But this problem was endemic to all
commercial transactions; without recovery of attorney's fees and court
costs, no one involved in commercial litigation could be made completely
whole.38 8 "Wallis was not talking about this defect in our jurisprudential
system," the court opined.3 8 9 "[]t had to do instead with the peculiar
loss associated with denial of payment of insurance proceeds, or, as in
Wallis, the peremptory interruption of monthly termination payments to
an aged, retired employee. ' ' 39 0 Again, by recognizing the systemic inadequacy of contract damages, the court impliedly acknowledged the possibility of inefficient breach. Nevertheless, the court refused to consider
whether tort remedies might be an appropriate means of deterring
breaches of contract that could not be justified on efficiency grounds. 9 1
In Story v. City ofBozeman,39 2 the Montana Supreme Court directly
addressed a challenge to efficient breach theory, conceding that "efficient
breach is rarely efficient; the winning party must pay the cost of recovering contract damages. ' 393 Nevertheless, the court continued, this problem did not support tort damages.3 94 Thus, with one stroke of its pen,
the Montana Supreme Court repudiated its earlier holding in Nicholson
v. United PacificInsurance391 that tort remedies were appropriate whenever a party acted unreasonably by committing an inefficient breach.3 96
Finally, in two other post-Foley decisions, the California Court of
Appeal refused to even acknowledge the possibility that inadequate damages might lead to inefficient breach. In Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific
Business Credit,3 97 the court held that breach of a commercial loan contract did not sound in tort, stating that ordinary contract damages were
adequate to make the prospective borrowers whole. 9 8 And in Martin v.
U-Haul Co. ,99 the court held that termination of an equipment dealership contract did not sound in tort, declaring that expectation damages
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id at 691, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
Id
Id
Id at 691-92, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
Id at 694, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990).
Id at 774.
Id
710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
Id at 1348.
222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 272 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
Id.
204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1988).
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Implications of the later cases

What is to be learned from the later cases, with their refusal to
adopt tort remedies as a means of deterring inefficient breach?
One possible inference can be eliminated at the outset. Several
scholars have suggested that, rather than award tort remedies as a means
of providing adequate compensation for breach of contract, the courts
should simply revise contract remedies to make them adequate-whether
by allowing the prevailing party to recover his or her attorney's fees and
court costs," 1 or by relaxing traditional limitations upon recovery of
contract damages as necessary to make an injured party whole. °2
Whatever the merits of these proposals, 4° 3 most courts have not adopted
them. Instead, as in the Foley4° 4 and Copesky4°5 decisions, the courts
simply have accepted the fact that traditional contract damages provide
inadequate compensation." 6 Therefore, refusal to award tort remedies
does not imply that contract remedies now provide adequate compensation.
Another, more credible inference is that the early cases addressed
unusual contractual relationships in which most breaches of contract
were inefficient. As discussed above, an insurer and insured are at financial odds because payment simply shifts money from the insurer to the
insured.' 7 Thus, the very nature of the insurance relationshipgives the
insurer an incentive to commit inefficient breach, retaining the insurance
proceeds in an effort to profit at the expense of the insured. Similarly, the
400. Id at 415, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
401. See Putz & Klippen, supra note 84, at 499; Chutorian, supra note 84, at 404.
402. See Traynor, supra note 84, at 12-14; Chutorian, supra note 84, at 403; Scallen, supra
note 83, at 1189-91.
403. Even adequate contract remedies might not be enough to deter insurers and other
persons who have strong incentives to commit inefficient breach. Some victims of breach
might not pursue claims to judgment, or could-for whatever reason-be reluctant to sue.
Thus, insurers would still have an incentive to commit inefficient breach on a grand scale, in
the hopes that only some plaintiffs would persist long enough to collect their adequate
compensation.
404. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
405. 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1991).
406. Additionally, in Story, the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the best solution to
the problem of inadequate remedies was for parties to include attorney's fees provisions in
their contracts. See Story, 791 P.2d at 774.
407. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234; see supra note 138 and
accompanying text.
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employer in Wallis" had little to gain by continuing to make support
payments to a former employee. The employer deliberately terminated
the payments, committing an inefficient breach in an attempt to gain at
the employee's expense. Thus, perhaps these early decisions simply reflected the fact that efficient allocation of resources was an inapplicable
policy within certain relationships that tended to yield mostly inefficient
breaches of contract.
By contrast, later decisions refusing to adopt tort remedies may reflect the fact that efficient allocation of resources remains a realistic policy objective within most contractual relationships. Although the
inadequacy of traditional contract remedies might induce the occasional
inefficient breach, efficient breach is also a possibility. Thus, the imposition of tort remedies, designed to deter and punish inefficient breach,
might have the undesirable side-effect of discouraging efficient breach.
By embracing limited contract remedies despite their inadequacy, the
later cases suggest that efficient allocation of resources remains an important policy goal, worth pursuing at the expense of the occasional inefficient breach.
The later decisions also reveal the importance of a related, but distinct, policy goal: economic growth. Limited contract remedies promote
economic growth by reducing and defining the financial risks that entrepreneurs must face.'
Consider, for example, the rule limiting recovery
for breach of contract to loss that the promisor has reason to foresee as a
probable result of breach when the contract is made.410 This rule has its
source in the hoary old case of Hadley v. Baxendale,41" decided in 1854.
Commenting upon the cultural origins of the rule, Friedman has noted:
From the point of view of those in the position of the defendant
in Hadley, the rule of the case was a risk-limiting rule, and
therefore a way of standardizing costs and rationalizing enterprise. Like some of the nineteenth-century tort rules, it protected industry and commerce from ruinous losses; like
abstraction in general, it won acceptance not simply because of
its ideological appeal but also because it seemed to further a
greater goal-economic growth and the encouragement of
industry.4 12
408.
409.
410.
411.

160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
See Chutorian, supra note 84, at 391.
See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979).
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).

412. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 126 (1965).
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Similarly, eliminating the specter of open-ended punitive damage
awards for bad faith breach of contract helps to reduce and standardize
the costs associated with contracts, thereby promoting commerce and
economic growth.4 13 Significantly, the Foley41 4 court expressly adopted
this rationale for its holding that tort remedies should not be made available in the employment context.
[S]everal factors combine to persuade us that in the absence of
legislative direction to the contrary contractual remedies
should remain the sole available relief for breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context. Initially, predictability of the consequences of actions
related to employment contracts is important to commercial
stability. In order to achieve such stability, it is also important
that employers not be unduly deprived of discretion to dismiss
an employee by the fear that doing so will give rise to potential
tort recovery in every case.41 5
Thus, when the condition of contract is measured by the later cases,
the diagnosis is robust health, rather than the death Gilmore prematurely
proclaimed. Offered the opportunity to replace classical contract remedies with more expansive tort remedies, the courts have refused to do so
in all but a few unusual contexts. Moreover, the later cases reflect the
continued significance of policies supporting limited contract remedies.
Efficient allocation of resources remains an important goal; and economic growth supports limited contract remedies today, just as it supported the development of such remedies during the nineteenth century.
V.

CONCLUSION

This review of the tumultuous history of the bad faith tort has
shown that Gilmore spoke too soon: Contract is alive and well. Admittedly, had the bad faith tort ever gained widespread acceptance, the substitution of expansive tort remedies for the narrow remedies traditionally
available for breach of contract would have stabbed classical contract
theory through the heart. But the menacing tort turned out to be a paper
tiger. Never experiencing widespread success, the tort ultimately was rejected, even by original enthusiasts such as California and Montana. The
courts' fervent reaffirmation of the very remedies that Gilmore character413. See Traynor, supra note 84, at 13.
414. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
415. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37 (citation omitted).
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ized as the core of classical contract theory demonstrates the continued
vitality of contract.
This study of the history of the bad faith tort has also shown that
contract stands on a firm policy foundation. As discussed, the rise of the
tort was supported by the development of a quasi-fiduciary model of contract and the implicit recognition of a moral obligation to keep promises.
Thus, contrary to Gilmore's theory, both social responsibility and individual freedom supported the temporary move away from contract towards tort. Ultimately, however, the courts reaffirmed traditional,
limited contract remedies, indicating the primary importance of efficient
allocation of resources and economic growth. When judged against altruism and individual freedom, these two economic goals apparently
weigh more heavily in the balance.4 16 Today, as before, "[t]he core of
' 427
concern of the law of contract [is] with the market. ,
Despite his errors, Gilmore cannot be dismissed entirely, for even
while proclaiming the death of contract, he was hedging his bets. Reflecting upon the fact that there are alternating rhythms of classicism and
romanticism in literature and the arts, he mused:
Perhaps we should admit the possibility of such alternating rhythms in the process of the law. We have witnessed the
dismantling of the formal system of the classical theorists. We
have gone through our romantic agony-an experience peculiarly unsettling to people intellectually trained and conditioned
as lawyers are. It may be that, in this centennial year, some
new Langdell is already waiting in the wings to summon us
back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, order, and wellarticulated theory. Contract is dead-but who knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter-tide may bring?4 18
Perhaps the dramatic fall of the bad faith tort is a harbinger of the
unlikely resurrection that Gilmore foresaw. More likely, to paraphrase
the irreverent words of America's favorite author and humorist, reports
of the death of contract simply have been greatly exaggerated.4" 9

416. See SHEPHERD, supra note 159, at 122-23; Michael Bayles, Introduction: The Purposes
of ContractLaw, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 613, 620 (1983).
417. FRIEDMAN, supra note 412, at 184.
418. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 103.

419. Towards the end of his long life, Mark Twain heard news reports of his own death.
Characteristically, he responded with a witticism, cabling back that reports of his death had
been greatly exaggerated. See Louis J. BUDD, OUR MARK TWAIN: THE MAKING op His
PUBLIC PERSONALITY 130 (1983).

